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Workers from the GLC's
direct labour 
organisation, London 
Community Builders, at 
work on the restoration of 
V\'esley House for use as a 
women's resource centre. 
With an increasing 
number of construction 
workers unemployed only 
the public sector offers a 
realistic strategy for the 
renovation of London's 
ageing housing and 
infrastructure. 
Photo: CLC. 
[Image removed at request of London Metropolitan Archive as a condition of digital distribution.]
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Construction 
Summary 
1. Over the past ten years, new orders in the construction industry in 
London have dropped by over £600 million (1980 prices); £100 million of this 
loss reflects declining industrial demand. The remainder is attributable to 
current government policy to reduce public expenditure. The overall 
reduction in the workload has led directly to an unprecedented loss of jobs 
and skills with an estimated 45,000 now unemployed in London. Declining 
building activity in the public sector has also intensified the already acute 
problems of housing shortages, compounded by continuing decay and 
disrepair. Postponing essential investmentin the renewal of London's ageing 
infrastructure will only increase the costs and complications of carrying out 
the work in the future . 
2. The private sector is neither equipped nor motivated to develop and 
implement a long-term strategy for the renovation of London's built 
environment. Only the public sector and in particular the GLC with its 
established expertise in all areas of development and construction activity can 
begin to piece together such a strategy. 
3. The future hope for the development of an alternative form of building 
production also lies with the public sector. Direct labour organisations, like 
the GLC's London Community Builders, with their commitmentto continuity 
and security of employment, present a radical contrast to the fragmented and 
insecure labour practices which characterise private contracting. More 
accountable to the public, with an investment programme based on social 
needs rather than on profitability, direct labour could be expanded to carry 
out all local authority building work, providing stable employment for 
thousands of London workers and training on a sufficient scale to guarantee 
the continuing survival of building skills within London. To enable direct 
labour to extend its range and area of work, it must be freed from the severe 
restraints currently imposed under the terms of the 1980 Planning and Land 
Act. In the meantime, the GLC has considerable scope within the framework 
of existing legislation to improve conditions of employment for the many 
thousands of building workers it employs indirectly on GLC contracts. 
4. The chapter falls roughly into four sections, all viewed within the 
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framework of current government policy. A brief but detailed description of 
housing need is followed by a lengthier look at the structure of the building 
industry. The recent history of DLOs is then presented as a contrasting 
alternative to the experience of private contracting and leads into the final 
discussion on the role the GLC might play - as building client and strategic 
authority - to improve construction in London. 
Construction - London Industrial Strategy 549 
Introduction 
22.01 1983 saw new orders for construction in the GLC area fall to 
three--quarters of their 1973 value in real terms. As a result more than one in five 
of London's construction workforce - 45,000 people - were on the dole in 
June 1982- the last time official figures were available. Unemployment in the 
industry reached this high level despite the fact that the number of building 
workers in London had already declined by 20% in the decade prior to the 1981 
census, falling far faster than the general decline in the London population and 
workforce. Even so, over one in ten of all the registered unemployed in Greater 
London last worked in the building industry. At the same time, there has been 
a growing shortage of skilled labour. This is clearly very bad news in a city 
whose sprawling Victorian infrastructure requires urgent renewal, where 
many modern facilities have still to be developed, where the conditions of the 
housing stock is known to be deteriorating alarmingly and where industry has 
suffered a major decline. 
22.02 The decline of London's construction industry is doubly destructive. 
The failure to set available resources to work to meet some of these pressing 
needs leads to a deterioration not only of the workforce and conditions of 
employment but also of the fabric of the city itself. For the most part, loss of 
building investment and jobs in London does not signify either relocation 
elsewhere or rationalisation of internationally organised production. The 
Table 1: Changes in New Orders in Construction. GLC area, 1973-1983, 
Constant (1980) prices 
Value of new 
orders £'s million 
Net 
change 
1973 1983 £'s million 
Public housing 393 120 -273 
Public other 637 467 -170 
Private housing 297 189 -108 
Private industrial 247 178 -69 
Private commercial 811 783 -28 
All new work 
(public and private) 2,385 1,737 -648 
% 
change 
-69% 
-27% 
-36% 
-28% 
-3% 
-27% 
Figures derived from implied deAator. Tables 1.1 and 1.3, Housing and Construction Statistics 1973-1983. 
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demand for construction services in London reflects requirements which are 
specific to London and cannot-like the manufacture of many commodities -
be transferred out. What distinguishes construction demand (as manifested in 
the need for the renovation of existing stock) is that it does not attract the 
orthodox market response, i.e . private investment, but relies instead on 
massive government support. · 
22.03 This explains why the construction industry, (unlike many of the other 
sectors discussed in this book), has always been integrally bound up with the 
public sector, not just in the design and production of the built environment 
but in its maintenance and management as well. This dependence has made it' 
especially vulnerable to current government policies designed to reduce the 
public sector presence in the economy - starving it of funds, restricting its 
ability to trade and stripping it of essential assets which determine its 
building/investment programmes. 
The impact of government policy 
22.04 First, capital spending has been drastically cut. In real terms, provision 
for spending by public sector clients in London in 1983 was less than half of what 
had been achieved in 1973. Spending by local authorities on London council 
housing was 70% lower in 1984-5 than in 1975-6, enforced primarily by 
reductions in Housing Investment Programme allocations (loan sanction) 
backed up by a government injunction to restrict the use of accumulated capital 
receipts. In 1983-4 prices, capital expenditure on public sector housing in 
Greater London has fallen by £400 million over the past four years. 
Non-housing public sector investment (on new schools, hospitals, etc.) has 
dropped by a third over the past decade. 
22.05 Second, public control over production has been seriously hampered 
by legislation crippling local authorities' own building operations traditionally 
carried out by direct labour organisations (DLOs). The 1980 Planning and Land 
Act attempts indirectly to facilitate the transfer of a much reduced workload 
from the public to the private sector by imposing tendering and trading 
restraints on DLOs that make it impossible for them to compete on equal terms 
with private contractors. 
22.06 Third, the government's vigorous promotion of council house sales 
(spurred by the offer of massive discounts) has led to a considerable reduction 
in the level of publically held assets. Much of the stock transferred from the 
GLC has passed quickly through the boroughs into the private sector- to date, 
7,000 ex-GLC dwellings have been sold, bringing the total number of dwellings 
sold in London to 41,000 since 1979. The campaign on behalf of home 
ownership in particular and privatisation in general, has served to weaken the 
argument for and confidence in a continuing strong public sector involvement 
in all activities including housing and construction which are still undertaken 
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Table 2: Council House Sales by London Boroughs as a percentage of local authority 
stock, 1 April 1979-13 March 1983• 
Total Sales of Total sales as a % 
Sales ex-GLC of local authority stock 
Stock in 
Total Sales: 
Houses only 
City of London 425 18 
Barking and Dagenham 3,236 825 9 
Barnet 1,280 553 7 
Bexley 1,325 11 
Brent 581 3 
Bromley 1,909 1,134 10 
Camden 218 1 
Croydon 2,290 11 
Ealing 2,768 171 13 
Enfield 1,443 6 
Greenwich 1,231 3 
Hackney 130 0.3 
Hammersmith and Fulham 772 4 
Haringey 914 362 4 
Harrow 867 9 
Havering 3,392 920 18 
Hillingdon 1,588 7 
Hounslow 1,153 5 
Islington 386 1 
Kensington and Chelsea 395 4 
Kingston upon Thames 801 11 
Lambeth 312 1 
Lewisham 1,152 758 3 
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Table 2: Council House Sales by London Boroughs as a percentage of local authority 
stock, 1 April 1979-13 March 1983• 
Total 
Sales 
Merton 1,492 
Newham 1,768 
Redbridge 1,406 
Richmond upon Thames 640 
Southwark 688 
Sutton 801 
Tower Hamlets 252 
Waltham Forest 1,201 
Wandsworth 3,873 
Westminster 717 
TOTALS 41,406 
• Stock includes ex-GLC stock transferred to boroughs 
Source: Local Housing Statistics and Council House Sales (GLC) 
Sales of Total sales as a % 
ex-GLC of local authority stock 
Stock in 
Total Sales: 
Houses only 
398 10 
5 
1,430 11 
7 
1 
398 6 
1 
6 
11 10 
-
6,407 
Note: More council dwellings have been sold in London since 1980 than have been completed or started by 
local authorities . Less than 10°10 of dwellings sold have been flats: over 75% of sales have been in the 
outer boroughs. 
by both sectors. Between 1979 and 1983, the number of central government 
employees in London (industrial and civil servant) declined by 14% . One in 
eight of these job losses was attributable to privatisation . The ideological battle 
seeks to obscure the fact that building activity carried out by private contractors 
is prompted by the need to generate profits rather than by broad social policy 
determined by elected representatives. Only a strategic planning authority can 
hope to prepare, co-ordinate and implement a long-term programme for the 
repair and renewal of the capital city. Such a function is badly needed. 
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Housing need 
22.07 London suffers a higher level of housing stress than the country as a 
whole. The 1981 Census found that over 110,000 households in London (4.4% 
of the total) did not live in self-contained accommodation. Greater London has 
the highest regional level of overcrowding-about 5% of London households 
(133,000) live at a density of more than one person per room - compared with 
about 3% for England and Wales. About 6% of households in London lack or 
share the use of a bath or shower, compared with 3% nationally. Individual 
London boroughs experience very high levels of housing stress according to 
census indicators - for example overcrowding in Tower Hamlets, the sharing 
of facilities in Hammersmith and Fulham and the dependence of Kensington 
and Chelsea residents on the private rented sector are all far in excess of the 
levels experienced in any of the metropolitan districts. The DOE's recent study 
of urban deprivation, based on census indicators, shows that the ten local 
authorities in England with the highest scores on the index of housing 
deprivation were all London boroughs. Nine of these ten boroughs had high 
resident ethnic minority populations, reflecting the fact that many ethnic 
minority households that make up 18% of London's population are often 
forced by low incomes and discrimination to live in some of the capital's worst 
housing. 
22 .08 In London both homelessness and local authority waiting lists, primary 
indicators of housing stress, continue to rise. In 1983, 24,000 households were 
accepted as homeless by the London boroughs. There are many other homeless 
households who are not accepted by the boroughs or do not quality under the 
Homeless Persons Act. There are for instance at least 20,000 single homeless 
people in London (GLC and housing voluntary agencies, best possible 
estimate) either living in unsatisfactory temporary accommodation or sleeping 
out. Those households who are accepted as homeless in London have a much 
lower chance of being offered permanent accommodation immediately than is 
the case over the rest of the country. A GLC survey reporting in 1984 showed 
many homeless households are likely to spend prolonged periods (up to three 
years in one of the boroughs) in inadequate bed and breakfast accommodation. 
The cost to the boroughs is considerable, over £6 million in 1982-3; resources 
which, but for the Government's restrictions on local authority housing capital 
expenditure, could be invested in permanent housing. The latest figures from 
the DOE for the first half of 1984 show that the number of homeless households 
continues to increase. 
22 .09 The GLC' s annual analysis of borough Housing Investment Program-
me submissions show that in 1983-4 90,000 households joined- or rejoined-
borough waiting lists. These now total over 240,000 households. Such is the 
pressure on local authority housing in London from the homeless that in 1982-3 
under 45% of new lettings were to households on waiting lists compared to 
70% nationally. The need for new local authority housing in London is shown 
by the size of borough and GLC transfer lists which stood at 115,000 
households in March 1984. 
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Housing Renewal 
22.10 The condition of London's housing stock is deteriorating at a growing 
rate. The Greater London House Condition Survey (GLHCS) carried out by the 
GLC in 1979 found that a total of 538,700 dwellings were either unfit or in 
serious disrepair (defined as needing more that £5,200 worth of work in 1985 
prices). An additional 95,900 lacked at least one basic amenity such as a bath or 
inside toilet. A recent SHAC report estimated that amalgamating current and 
future needs over the next decade gives a projected total of over one million 
unsatisfactory dwellings in London by 1994 (excluding major technical defects 
in systems-built estates and repairs which cost less than £5,200 in 1985 prices). 
22.11 The GLC Housing Department has calculated that a ten year 
programme to eliminate serious disrepair and unfitness in London's housing 
stock would require 4,000 new dwellings and 70,000 rehabilitations each year in 
addition to the current level of activity. Though involving a £860 million 
increase in annual public expenditure on housing, it would simply constitute a 
return to the investment levels of the mid 1970s. This is in accord with the draft 
alterations to the Greater London Development Plan which outlines a 
programme to meet current housing needs and those of the projected 
population to 1992 at an estimated cost of £1.3 billion a year. The net level of 
additional public investment would be less than half this total when the 
increases in tax income accruing from the additional jobs created and the 
corresponding reduction in costs of unemployment are taken into account. 
22.12 A programme of housing renewal of these dimensions would create 
around 40,000 jobs in the construction industry, another 20,000 in the supply 
and service industries and further employment through multiplier effects and 
the circulation of additional income in the economy. Because the construction 
industry relies heavily on British materials and is labour intensive almost all 
these jobs would be in the UK. The training schemes necessary to support a 
programme of this scale would guarantee the preservation of a skilled labour 
force within London. 
22.13 The gross provision for public housing investment in London in 1985-6 
is likely to be over 11 % less in real terms than in 1984-5. Available resources 
have been cut by 60% since 1979 and now constitute 30% of the level attained in 
1975. Nationally, while housing capital expenditure stood at 10~'~ of total public 
expenditure in the mid 1970s, the latest government expenditure plans show 
that by 1986-7 it will have fallen to under 2°{:,. 
22.14 As figure 1 shows, the area of local authority activity hardest hit by the 
cut in resources has been new building. In 1982-3, the number of new homes 
completed by local authorities in London was only 26°~ of that achieved in 
1976. Far from moving into the void left by the decline in public sector housing 
construction, private sector completions also fell over the same period. It is 
therefore inappropriate on the basis of past experience to expect the private 
sector to play a major role in providing new housing for Londoners. First of all, 
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Figure 1: Greater London housing capital expenditure by 
programme 1975-76 to 1983-84 (£m 1983-84 prices) 
£m 1983-4 
Outturn Prices 
1200-.-----.-------,------,.--------.------,r-----r-----,----, 
New Building 
Renovation of LA dwellings 
Renovation grants 
--------
Lending to housing associations - - -
Home loans 
Acquisitions 
Slum clearance 
• • • • • 
-·-·-·-
........... 
700-1------~f-----+----~ ---+----f-----+-------,-------t 
600-1----------,f-----+----f------'lrl----f-----+-------,f--------t 
o-+----f-----+----f-----+----f-----+----f--------1 
1975-6 1976-7 1977-8 1978-9 1979-80 1980-1 1981-2 1982-3 1983-4 
1982-3 and 1983-4 figures exclude Low Cost Home Ownership Schemes. 
Source: HIP2 submissions 1979 to 1984 
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it builds virtually nothing for low-income groups with special housing needs-
primarily elderly, disabled and single people. These groups are almost totally 
dependent on the public sector for assistance with their housing problems. 
Secondly, there are special circumstances in London that discourage 
speculative new building in general. Housing land is scarce and its price 
roughly three times higher than in the next most expensive UK region. Though 
developers try to counteract this by building to higher densities, the average 
price of land per dwelling is still 54% higher in London than in England and 
Wales. The cost of construction is itself also higher in London (estimated at 
about 35% higher per dwelling) and many sites which appear to be available 
are difficult, i.e. costly to develop because they are small, often polluted and/or 
beset by planning constraints. The availability elsewhere of more easily 
developable open field sites with relatively good access to London tends to 
make building outside the central area (where need is greatest) more attractive 
for the private builder. 
22 .15 Since the early seventies, renovation of private houisng with the aid of 
grant subsidy has been the only area of London housing to show an increase in 
activity. The total of 45,000 renovations in 1983 equalled roughly five times the 
1970 level. Growth in the rate of improvement since 1981 has been made 
possible through rises in the maximum eligible expenses levels on which 
renovation grants are payable. These have risen three times since July 1980 
which has increased demand. In London, the GLC gave grants on three times 
as many dwellings in 1982 as in 1980. Even with such high levels of grants, the 
pace of renovation has been inadequate to tackle the massive backlog of repair. 
The Greater London House Conditions Survey found that much of the stock in 
the worst condition was in the owner-occupied and privately rented sectors 
and occupied by low income families and the elderly. Many of them cannot 
afford to renovate their homes even with the help of renovation grants. These 
are already scarce due to government restrictions on housing capital 
expenditure and cuts in the maximum percentage of grant that can be given, 
and are likely to become more so if means testing is introduced. If the limits are 
rigidly set, the government could well use means-testing as a way to restrict the 
overall level-as well as the distribution - of improvement grants. In a further 
clamping down of repair work, the March 1984 budget extended VAT to 
hitherto exempt building alterations work- equivalent to a further cut of up to 
15% in improvement grants.In supporting measures of this kind, the 
government clearly demonstrates its failure to develop an effective policy to 
combat London's housing problems. 
22.16 Despite government faith in the rule of the market, it is unrealistic to 
expect the private sector on its own to tackle the inherited problems of housing 
stress in London. These have been remained intractable at least partly because 
they cannot be easily packaged into profit-generating parcels of work. Though 
the private sector continues to add to the problem (there are an estimated 
200,000 owner-occupied homes in London considered to be in serious 
disrepair), it depends to a large extent on grants from the public sector to fund 
renovation and repair schemes. Government policies designed to reduce 
public expenditure are therefore unlikely to reverse or even halt the 
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deterioration of London's housing stock. For the public sector, real cuts in 
resources present the possibility that local authority housing will be reduced to 
the residual role of a welfare net. The consequences of this policy for those in 
housing need are apparent in the increasing numbers of Londoners on growing 
waiting lists. 
Infrastructure renewal 
22.17 The condition of London's infrastructure like its housing, presents 
special problems reflecting the inevitable inheritance of uncontrolled develop-
ment associated with the growth of a Victorian capital city. A great deal of the 
infrastructure predates the First World War - 67% of ILEA and 85% of 
voluntary primary schols, 25% of London's gas mains, almost half the water 
mains and most of the surviving docks, wharves and warehouses. Most of this 
extensive network of services was commissioned by a multiplicity of small 
private firms that were municipalised much later than in other large cities. 
Added to the problems of decay surrounding ageing stock are the more recent 
problems associated with post-Second World War building techniques and 
materials - faulty systems, high alumina cement, asbestos, etc. These have 
affected a large number of post-war hospitals and schools as well as the more 
highly publicised blocks of flats and have led the DES to expect 'that unit costs 
for maintenance will continue to rise until the 1990s.' 
22.18 Major investment flowing from a co-ordinated long term strategy is 
essential to deal coherently with these problems. A continuing failure to 
maintain and renew existing assets will only compound future problems and 
leave London in a more disadvantaged position compared with other major 
European cities . Increased investment, on the other hand, can not only reverse 
this trend but aid materially in the recovery of the construction industry, 
providing jobs and training opportunities for many thousands of building 
workers and so indirectly helping to revive local economies. In addition, 
enhanced investment will encourage existing firms supplying the industry 
(with materials, plant and equipment) to remain in London and possibly even 
to expand their activities to participate in the development and implementation 
of new technologies. 
Inside the industry 
22 .19 The previous pages paint a bleak picture of the gaps that exist between 
what needs to be done, what is being done and what could be done given the 
high levels of unemployment in the sector. But it would be a mistake to assume 
that a simple reversal of policy would solve the problems of the construction 
industry. For it is not simply a case of throwing more resources at the sector in 
order to bring supply into equality with demand and potential. The problems 
are much more fundamental and embedded within the organisation of the 
industry. 
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The private contracting system 
22 .20 The instability of building firms, the disorganisation of the labour force, 
the discontinuity of the workload- all represent, within an irrational system, 
rational responses to the demands of the private contracting system which 
dominates building production in both the public and private sectors. 
Contracting transforms building activity into a series of sporadic disconnected 
individual projects of finite length . It is highly probable for example, that most 
of the building and civil engineering operatives who built the Thames Barrier 
were taken on by one of the main or sub-contractors specifically and exclusively 
for the duration of the project and dispersed upon completion. In the absence 
of guaranteed future orders, survival, for a building firm as for a building 
worker, depends on maintaining a flexibility that would be crippling in other 
industries. Employment within firms expands and contracts with the 
workload: even the largest national contractors maintain only a very small -
and largely managerial - permanent staff. In construction, there is a general 
Table 3: Construction Employment with Private Contractors (thousands) 
Operatives Only Total Construction 
Employment 
Greater Great Greater Great 
London Britain London Britain 
1974 191.8 857.8 279.1 1221.8 
1975 185.2 820.3 268.8 1169.1 
1976 165.0 774.8 242.1 1110.1 
1977 156.3 729.0 227.3 1029.1 
1978 158.2 757.6 233.5 1083.8 
1979 162.6 790.0 242.5 1140.2 
1980 148.9 729.6 229.5 1091.3 
1981 126.0 626.6 200.9 975.5 
1982 113.0 618.2 185.3 988.8 
1983 106.8 611.8 180.9 1006.8 
Percentage 
change 
1974-1983 -44.3% -28.7% -35.2~0 -17.6% 
Source: Housing and Construction Statistics 1973-83 Tables 3.4 and 3.5 
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premium on the ability to respond quickly, whether to changes in the pattern of 
skills required, in the type or location of work, or in investment strategies 
relating to the purchase of, for example, land or plant and equipment. Firms -
and their workforce - must adopt appropriate risk strategies or perish. Both 
the high numbers of bankruptcies and the flight of skilled labour from the 
industry demonstrate the destructive effects of long term uncertainty. 
Disadvantages to the public sector client 
22.21 Though both sectors suffer from a system which creates no necessary 
links between rewards to contractors and benefits to clients, the public sector 
operates with considerably greater handicaps and less scope for action. As an 
essential part ofi ts £id uciary responsibility, it is generally required to accept the 
lowest tender for any contract in order to be seen to uphold a paper 
commitment to the notion of fair competition. In practice, accepted tenders 
bear little relationship to final costs and the public client is inevitably saddled 
with most of the difference between the two. Most of the excess costs arise from 
a failure of contracting to operate efficiently. Instances of this failure include 
massive cost overruns on delayed work (exemplified by the Harrogate 
Conference Centre which rose from an original tender of £8 million to final 
costs of £28 million); costs associated with renegotiating a contract where the 
original builder has either gone bankrupt or defaulted on the job; and vast sums 
for remedial work in connection with defects appearing after the contractor's 
liability has expired. In most cases, the public sector foots the bill for these 
excesses and so helps to subsidise - and perpetuate - a grossly inadequate 
system of building. 
22.22 Because the public sector must still rely on contracting to carry out most 
of its building work, it is essential to describe in some detail the repercussions 
of the system on: 
(a) the organisation and activity of building firms; 
(b) the conditions of employment of the workforce. 
This will help to clarify both the scope for remedial action that might be feasible 
within the existing legislative framework and the possibilities for more radical 
change which the public sector, and the GLC in particular, can address. 
Scope and scale of construction activity 
22 .23 The great majority of building firms, composed of very few employees, 
comprise the so-called 'jobbing' builders who specialise in small-scale repair 
and maintenance, particularly in private sector housing. Primarily local 
builders, their network of contacts with local labour and materials suppliers 
gives them an operational edge over competitors from other areas (including 
much larger builders). Though their activities and income have always proved 
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notoriously difficult to measure, available DOE statistics estimate that the 
15,000 firms employing less than seven operatives now account for about 88% 
of all firms, but for only about 20% of output (in value terms). This represents 
considerable growth. The number of small firms has almost doubled in London 
since 1979, with its share of the total number of firms rising by 13%. In practice, 
this figure is even higher because a substantial number of the larger firms 
registered in London only operate head offices in the city and actually 
undertake most if not all of their contract work elsewhere. The large firms also 
tend to deal in the business of obtaining contracts which are then subcontracted 
in major part to a host of small firms with a line of intermediaries in between. 
22.24 The restructuring of the industry into small firms effectively demons-
trates the destabilising effect of current government policy. Small firms, in 
many respects, embody the worst features of the industry; they offer the least 
security of employment, are least likely to offer any of a broad range of welfare 
payments (for example, holiday, pension or sickness schemes), pay least 
attention to the provision of safe sites (with a correspondingly high accident 
rate) and suffer the highest bankruptcy rates. Their increasing proliferation, 
therefore, represents a backward step for the industry. 
22.25 Though more than 90% of all building firms in the UK generate 
turnovers of less than £100,000 per year, the relatively few very large-scale 
national contractors with turnovers of £50 million or more, still claim a sizeable 
portion of building work, in markets they dominate. The 38 largest firms who 
employ 1,200 or more operatives each, make up only a tiny fraction of the total 
number of building firms (over 140,000) yet they accounted for 14% of the total 
value of work done in 1982. For them, the most important factor is to win 
contracts, irrespective of their ability to undertake them, for that can be left to 
depend upon the system of subcontracting. Evidence for this is indicated by the 
extent to which the large firms seek profitability through flexibility. This is 
Table 4: Liquidations in Construction 
Creditors' 
Compulsory Voluntary 
Liquidations Liquidations Total 
1980 446 503 949 
1981 396 594 990 
1982 578 844 1422 
1983 891 885 1776 
Source: Companies in 1981 , 1982, 1983, Department of Trade, London HMSO. 
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sometimes through the incorporation of building firms within conglomerates 
or multinational corporations. Bovis, for example, has been owned since the 
mid-1970s by P&O Steam Navigation; Trollope and Colls is owned by Trafalgar 
House, which also owns Ideal Homes and has recently purchased Comben, 
another house-building firm. From the point of view of the parent company, 
the building firm is just one of a great many subsidiaries that the company 
controls. The overall investment profile of such a company considers the 
relative profitability of all its constituent firms in determining the distribution 
of resources between them. Where and when building activity appears as 
relatively unprofitable in all sectors, the decision might be made to withdraw 
from construction altogether and transfer investment perhaps into another 
industrial sector or perhaps into another country. So the fate of a large number 
of building workers in London is in the hands of a very few large firms whose 
continuing investment in construction activity is not at all guaranteed. 
Subcontracting 
22.26 The years since the war have witnessed the narrowing and fragmenta-
tion of building work through the adoption and widespread use of 
subcontracted labour. In response to the uncertainty of future workload, 
subcontracting came to replace the direct employment of labour as a means of 
reducing financial risks by spreading it across a much greater number of firms. 
Formerly the main contractor, in line with established practice, undertook the 
hiring and co-ordination of all labour on site, skilled and unskilled. With the 
growth of subcontracting, many areas of work have been hived off from the 
main contract into wholly self-contained parcels of work and awarded to 
smaller firms. This has introduced yet another layer of complexity into the 
construction process for several reasons. 
22 .27 First, the main contractor has lost direct control over the quality of 
labour on site. There is no longer any direct knowledge of either the level of 
standards applied in training nor of the previous experience of the 
subcontracted labour. Secondly, since each subcontractor functions as a wholly 
independent firm, each can operate different recruitment and pay schemes. 
The simultaneous presence of several different subcontractors on the same site 
may, therefore, involve a wide range of employment practices covering 
different rates of pay and different paces of work. This situation can only 
undermine efforts to develop site-wide organisation of labour, an essential 
prerequisite for the successful co-ordination of work. 
22.28 A third drawback of subcontracting, especially for local authorities, is 
the loss of client control through the lack of a direct link between the local 
authority architect and those organising work on site. In other words, 
subcontracting exacerbates the already considerable problems associated with 
the separation of design from the building process. It puts several additional 
obstacles between the architectural team and those who implement their ideas 
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on site. The practice of subcontracting puts building workers beyond the 
architects' reach and so inhibits the potential for two-way consultation at the 
design stage. Inappropriate details cannot always be identified in advance 
either because they depend on the work of other subcontractors in the building 
chain or because the architects may not always be aware of the best current 
practice. 
Self-employment and the 'Lump' 
22.29 The growth of subcontracting was accompanied and promoted by the 
introduction of new forms of wage payments . Until the war, trade unions 
maintained their traditional resistance to all forms of payments other than the 
-standard wage . But during the war, the Ministry of Works introduced 
payments by results. This was widely applied in government-sponsored 
production. In 1947, faced with continuing government pressure, the unions in 
the National Joint Council for the Building Industry agreed to accept a system 
of bonus payments, with the bonus pooled for all men on site . The 
development of the Festival of Britain site is thought to be the first systematic 
application of this new practice . 
22 .30 Once multiple forms of payment were introduced, the opportunities for 
abuse were rife. Individuals or groups of workers who felt they could work 
harder and hence attract higher than average earnings were easily drawn to 
accepting subcontracts that allowed them to reap all the benefits of their greater 
productivity themselves without having to share pooled bonuses. Under such 
arrangements men are hired to perform clearly specified tasks for a 
pre-arranged 'lump' sum rather than being involved in a complex network of 
incentives. In this way, they are hired for their labour only by comparison with 
the traditional practice of 'supply and fix' where skilled tradesmen provide 
materials and tools and perform a wider range of tasks on site. 
22 .31 As a specialised form of subcontracting, firms supplying labour only 
have sometimes been considered as 'bona fide ' in the sense that employers in 
such firms bear all the normal responsibilities towards their workforce who are 
treated as 'employees' with full entitlements. But the practice of labour only has 
inevitably moved away from this form of organisation into more loosely 
defined groups of workers who are more legitimately thought of as 
self-employed than as employees. 
22.32 By the late 1960s, the practice of self-employment had become 
widespread enough to be visible on a national scale . The Inland Revenue 
became concerned about the scale of tax loss arising from illegal practices of tax 
evasion and avoidance known to be associated with the so-called 'self-
employed' in the building industry. This prompted the decision to issue 714 
(tax exemption) certifications to operatives with proven experience (i.e . to 
those who could demonstrate previous employment in the construction 
industry for three of the past six years). The scheme was first introduced by the 
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Finance Act 1971 with attempts to close up some existing loopholes in 1975. The 
number of 714 certificates active at any one time has grown steadily since the 
start of the scheme. Over the year April 1983 to April 1984 the number grew by 
almost 14%. By November 1984, there were, according to Inland Revenue, 
465,000 active 714 certificate holders nationally, compared with a figure of 
975,000 directly employed. 
22.33 The organisation of the workforce into self-employed, whether 'bona 
fide' or on the 'lump', reflects two tendencies-first, the demand for flexibility 
for which the employer sacrifices direct control over the composition and 
quality of the workforce and secondly, the drive to reduce overheads, 
expressed in various schemes to minimise payment of tax. Whilst there may be 
some short-term benefits to self-employed workers who avoid the deduction of 
tax from gross pay, it is the employers who tend to gain most, particularly 
when their bargaining position is enhanced by high unemployment. For 
example, one trade union estimated in 1983 that a self-employed worker on £30 
per day saved a typical subcontractor £50 per week, broken down as follows : 
Employer's national insurance contributions 
Holiday stamp payment 
Seven public holidays per year, averaged at 
TOTAL SAVINGS 
£35perweek 
£12perweek 
£3perweek 
£SO per week 
22.34 In addition, self-employment of operatives allows the employer to 
avoid payment for 'wet time', i.e. wages to employees who are prevented by 
the weather from carrying out work on site. It also releases the employer from 
the obligations imposed by the Employment Protection Act, which covers, for 
example, Notice Entitlement, requiring one week's notice after four weeks' 
employment and, after two years, one week for each year served. 
22.35 The corresponding benefits to employees are, however, much more 
questionable. Though the self-employed operative can avoid deduction of tax 
from gross pay, this one so-called advantage costs him/her dearly. Perhaps 
most importantly, the self-employed lose the right to claim unemployment 
benefit. In an industry where bouts of unemployment between jobs is the 
norm, this is a critical drawback. An OPCS survey carried out among building 
workers revealed that, for the age group26-31 years, almosthalfofworkershad 
had four or more jobs in a period of five years. Self-employed operatives are 
also ineligible for disablement benefit since these too depend on employment 
status. Instead, they must fall back on sickness benefit for which they qualify 
only if they have satisfied contribution requirements. So, for the short-term 
gain in gross income which the bona fide self-employed enjoy, they sacrifice 
those minimum welfare benefits available to directly employed workers. 
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22.36 Employers' preference for self-employment has been strong and 
growing over the past few years, especially in London. It has not been 
uncommon to find main contractors transforming their workforce from direct 
to self-employment literally overnight - by summarily dismissing directly 
employed workers who are then immediately re-hired as self-employed. 
Limited industrial action carried out in response by building unions in London 
has had almost no impact on this practice. 
22.37 The fragmented and semi-formal employment of labour has important 
industry-wide effects. It is associated with an instability and mobility of 
employment that prevents expertise being built up within firms employing a 
relatively steady workforce. 
Training 
22.38 The generally unstable organisation of the industry leads to very high 
levels of labour turnover, more than double the manufacturing average. This 
situation reinforces the tendency for the industry to provide inadequate 
training for the workforce. Enterprises have little incentive to make provision 
for training when the skilled will shortly be drawn away to other firms or into 
self-employment. The post-war period as a whole has been marked by the 
decline of the craft-based apprenticeship system- a decline heavily reinforced 
by the greater spread of subcontracting and the growth of the lump over the 
past 15 years. The last three years in particular have witnessed a drastic 
curtailment of apprenticeship recruitment which has brought the level of 
training in the industry to an unprecedented low. The number of apprentices 
registered in London has fallen from 3,089 in June 1980 to 2,003 in June 1984. 
There must also be doubts over the standard of training given to registered 
apprentices in some areas of the private sector. Apprentices can all too often be 
used as cheap labour - placed on labouring work at times of relative slack, set 
to skilled tasks alone in a rush, and either way receiving sustained training only 
intermittently if at all. 
22.39 As a result of the precipitate decline in the number of private sector 
apprenticeships the construction industry has become steadily more depen-
dent on the public sector and on direct labour training activities for the 
provision of its skilled workers of the future. At the end of 1983 direct labour 
organisations in London employed some 14% of all the sector's workers but 
provided about 35% of all training places. This is the situation despite the fact 
that they cannot benefit from the financial aid offered to private contractors 
through the CITB nor may they now discount their training costs when 
assessing their financial performance. Central government reneged on its 
assurance that training costs would be excluded from the provisions for 
calculating rates of return on capital; this has left Direct Labour Organisations 
effectively hamstrung by the 'fair' competition regulations promoted in the 
1980 Act. Given the overall pressures exerted by the Act on DLOs, there are 
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currently very considerable doubts over what level of training the public sector 
can offer in the future. Despite the overall fall in demand that continues to 
afflict construction in general, there is now a very real probability that past 
skills shortages will recur in severe form in the future as numbers of skilled 
workers abandon an unstable sector of employment and the overall volume 
and standard of training continues to fall. 
22.40 The concept of co-ordinated craft-based training for a life's work 
embodied in the traditional apprenticeship has been further undermined by 
the introduction of the Youth Training Scheme. YTS has been developed as 
part of the government's New Training Initiative to provide 12-month youth 
traineeships to young people under 18 years of age, (some 300,000 young 
people have begun training so far). The scheme, in all its essential features, is 
wholly consistent with the government's commitment to a market-led 
economy and its consequent efforts to erode the authority of the industrial 
training board system . The CITB has itself taken on the role of managing agent 
for YTS trainees in the building industry. Under this arrangement, trainees are 
allocated on a 'labour agency basis' to sponsoring employers. The convenience 
of this arrangement may be one reason why 82% of the 20,000 YTS target 
placement had been realised in construction at a time when the overall average 
was only around 50%. This has been achieved despite the YTS rate of only £25 
per week, and the lack of any long-term employment prospects. 
22 .41 The MSC is currently hoping to introduce by 1985 an even more radical 
change in the provision of training for the industry. It is proposing to switch the 
organisation of training away from its traditional dependence on time-serving 
models (as with craft apprenticeship schemes) and base it on the concept of 
skills-testing. The MSC's position, in effect, undermines the broad base of 
traditional craft trades by seeking to replace them with a series of discrete skills, 
each geared to particular jobs on site rather than to acquiring a wide range of 
skills for a lifetime's work. This will inevitably produce a generation of 
'handymen' who will only increase the fragmentation of skills and so inevitably 
add to the difficulties of organising labour on site. 
22.42 If this short-sighted approach to private sector training gains ground, 
and apprenticeships are further eroded by government commitment to YTS, 
the continuation of broad-based training will become the exclusive preserve of 
local authorities . DLOs will not only have to train all their own labour; they may 
well have to undertake more direct provision of training for the private sector as 
the inadequacy of private sector schemes become more apparent and the lack of 
skilled labour more critical. The GLC could then be well-placed to initiate a 
much larger-scale training programme, in conjunction with other local 
authorities. The future availability of building skills will certainly depend to a 
large extent on provision by the public sector. 
22.43 The GLC is giving active consideration to ways in which it might help 
the construction industry to avert a crisis in skill shortages arising in connection 
with a revival in building activity. In co-operation with building contractors 
and London Community Builders, the GLC would introduce a new training 
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programme to guarantee the continuing supply in London of a fully trained 
workforce; 200 apprentices (staggered over a year) would be taken into an 
expanded three or four year training scheme. The GLC would bear the first year 
costs of training (with some possible support from the Manpower Services 
Commission) and would employ five apprentice instructors to take responsibil-
ity for the full three or four year programme of a group of 40 trainees. After the 
first year (to include the six-month CITB course), the apprentice instructors 
would organise and co-ordinate on-site training in six-month modules, 
distributed between London Community Builders and London contractors. 
Each employer would be financially responsible for apprentices only while 
they are being actively trained (i.e. only for six months). In this way, total costs 
could be spread over several employers instead of being borne wholly by the 
public sector as at present. Bringing private contractors into public sector 
training would also extend the range of building skills available in London 
since the GLC and ILEA are largely limited to skills associated with housing 
and schools work and miss out on specialist skills employed on other 
(large-scale) building projects. 
Health and Safety 
22.44 The lack of care that the industry shows towards the training of its 
employees is repeated in the case of safety where the expedient of cost 
reduction on the individual site is more important than industry-wide 
regulation. No one disputes that construction is among the most dangerous of 
industries. What distinguishes it from other traditionally high-risk industries 
(notably manufacturing, mining and quarrying) is both the constancy of its 
poor safety record over a considerable period and, related to this, its enduring 
resistance to regulation. The first piece of industrial safety legislation, the Coal 
Mines Bill of 1842, had a clause prohibiting the employment of anyone under 21 
or over 50 as driver of a hoist. It took more than 100 years before a similar 
provision for site hoists was introduced in construction. In fact, most of the 
safety regulations in construction are merely adaptations of principles first 
applied often many years previously in factories. Though several generations 
of regulations have followed, there has still been no continuous marked 
decrease in the rate of construction fatalities. The number of deaths per 100,000 
persons employed in construction was 19 in 1937 and 20 over thirty years later 
in 1968. As Figure 1 illustrates, both the railways and the coal industry have 
witnessed dramatic declines in their fatality rates as a result of the 
industry-wide enforcement of regulations in the wake of nationalisation. 
22.45 This poor safety performance has often been explained by reference to 
the inescapable dangers inherent in building work, dangers compounded by 
the diversity of tasks underway at any given moment on site, and by the 
enormous variation in the size, speed and interaction of participating work 
gangs. The increasing complexity introduced by subcontracting clearly 
exacerbates this problem. In addition to relying on site organisation for an 
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Figure 2: Number of industrial fatalities: 1940 to 1975 
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Figure 3: Fatalities per 100,000 employees: 1938 to 1974 
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explanation of poor safety conditions, the commonly held view also 
emphasises the role and responsibility of the individual worker. The Health 
and Safety at Work Report (the Robens Report) which was the forerunner of the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, argued that apathy was the 'most 
important single reason for accidents at work'. Although this appraisal applied 
to members of the board, managers and supervisors as weHas to workers on 
site, it deflected the discussion away from more explicitly economic and 
political issues towards exclusively behavioural attitudes . The emphasis on 
individual motivation led to a position that stressed self-inspection and 
self-regulation at the expense of government intervention at the industry-wide 
level. It also left unexplained why 'apathy' should be more pronounced or 
persistent in construction than in other industries. 
22.46 The low level of unionisation in construction has also discouraged 
efforts to introduce improvements. Even where a union has gained a foothoid, 
an operative elected to be safety representative one week may easily be made 
redundant the next. Some union members have claimed that safety reps face 
harassment on site and suffer blacklisting when moving to other sites. In any 
case, regional and national union strategies have tended to focus more on 
accident compensation than on accident prevention since the former does not 
need to be negotiated at the individual site level. In extreme cases, the flagrant 
disregard of safety regulations has been so widespread that unions have 
actually been able to resort to 'working to safety rules' in order to win 
concessions on wages. 
22.47 Besides the obvious dangers to building workers, construction activity 
creates additional hazards for council tenants when modernisation and 
up-gra<;ling schemes transform their estates into 24-hour construction sites. 
Materials left lying about blocking pathways, easily accessible scaffolding, 
inadequate temporary roof coverings, all create potentially dangerous 
situations for tenants, especially at night. Poorly lit and unmarked holes dug 
along access paths are a particular hazard to the disabled and women with 
small children and prams. Tenants exposed in this way are not explicitly 
covered by any health and safety legislapon but only very generally by third 
party insurance. Because it is such a grey legal area, the GLC has developed a 
code of practice for contractors which specifically addresses this problem. 
When in force, the code might become a model for other local authorities. 
Supplementing rather than replacing other statutory obligations, the code will 
require contractors to take measures to guarantee that tenants are not 
unreasonably disturbed or put at hazard,. 
Direct labour and the role of the public sector 
22.48 The GLC, like other local authorities, is significant as a direct employer 
and organiser of building work itself through its own DLO, London 
Community Builders (LCB). At its best, direct labour, with its emphasis on 
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Figure 4: Proportion of men who say they have some 
disability that prevents them from doing as much work or 
the kind of work they would like, by age 
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Figure: 5 Labour Mobility in Construction 
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continuity and security of employment and its established commitment to 
long-term training and safe working practices, offers a striking contrast to the 
system of private contracting described above . But it offers more than a 
superior organisation of labour, impressive as this can be. If unfettered by 
restrictive legislation, direct labour could be comprehensively developed as an 
effective alternative to contracting. Released from the requirement to tender 
and from investment determined by profitability, local authorities would be 
free to develop long-term building programmes based on the projected needs 
of local tenants and consumers. The greatly increased workload that would 
result would allow not only for increased training but for increased 
specialisation either within individual DLOs or extended across several, 
operating in consortia . Consortia might also be organised for the purchase of 
costly plant and equipment which becomes a viable solution given the 
guarantee of a continuous workload. 
22.49 To understand both the restricted role of the DLOs in the past and their 
potential for expanded development in the future it is useful to outline their 
historical as well as their recent development in London. 
The origins of direct works: the public sector alternative 
22 .50 Before the 1890s, the LCC was mainly a rate-collecting agency, 
awarding contracts for all local services that were not privately owned and 
operated. A series of corruption scandals had been associated with the building 
contracts let by its predecessor, the Metropolitan Board of Works, and in 
setting up its own works department in 1892, the LCC established a precedent 
for the provision of municipal enterprises i.e. operating a public service on the 
basis of lowest cost rather than highest profit. The creation of a building works 
department was also directly connected with the Council's attempts to 
implement a 'Fair Wages Clause' in negotiating contracts with private builders. 
Tenders for council work had to apply rates of wages and conditions of 
employment prevailing among trade unions in London. When this forced 
tenders up to unprecedented levels, the Council determined to undertake the 
work itself by the direct employment of building labour. The first job of the new 
works department was building the York Road sewer in Lambeth. (The lowest 
tender received for this job was £11,000; the works department completed it for 
under £7,000). 
22.51 Widespread public sector involvement in building has grown, from 
these early experiments, to generate over time a wholly separate institutional 
framework from that governing private sector construction work. Two distinct 
approaches to construction have emerged side by side in response to two sets 
of criteria which have little in common; the need to generate an acceptable level 
of profit on the one hand and, on the other, the need to fulfill the statutory 
duties of a local authority. During this century, the shares of different public 
sector markets going to the minority direct labour and majority private sector 
contracting industry have also shifted with time - and relations between the 
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two sectors have alternated between uneasy co-existence in periods of 
expansion when it has proved almost impossible to get private firms to 
undertake the less profitable repair work, and attempts to limit and even 
extinguish the role of DLOs during periods of downturn, when the private 
sector wishes to obtain business at any cost. At such times, most notably in 
1908, and the late 1920s and 1950s, the private building industry has mobilised 
on its behalf whatever political forces it can in order to attack the DLOs. 
Background to the current conflict 
22.52 This pattern has repeated itself in recent years. In the early 1970s, an 
uneasy coexistence between DLOs and contractors held firm as the 
expansionist policies of 1972-3 fuelled the property boom, generating very high 
levels of commercial and office development and a surge in speculative 
housebuilding. In these conditions highly inflated tender prices from private 
contractors became commonplace, yet even so many public authorities had 
difficulty in letting contracts. Where DLOs existed they often expanded or 
re-entered the field of new build- in some cases they were re-established; this 
happened in Birmingham, for example, where the DLO had been closed only 
four years previously. 
22.53 The slump that followed the property boom made public sector work 
much more attractive to contractors especially as it became rapidly apparent 
that lower workloads in the private sector were likely to persist. However, 
DLOs had taken over many projects where contractors had defaulted when the 
property boom collapsed, and continued to undertake a high proportion of 
new build work. Given their increased dependence on the public sector order 
book for survival and profitability, and the impact of cuts in capital expenditure 
following the IMF agreement of 1976, contractors' hostility to direct labour now 
increased. At the same time, successions of building failures had thrown a 
public spotlight onto the inefficiency of the construction industry as a whole, 
and the need for greater public sector control and direct ownership in the 
industry was being promoted by the labour movement as a means of improving 
both the quality of its output and employment conditions within it. In these 
circumstances the employers organisations were explicit in linking 'the threat 
of nationalisation' with the future of direct labour. Campaigners against direct 
labour at this time included the Federation of Master Builders, the National 
Federation of Building Trades Employers, and AIMS for Freedom and 
Enterprise. 
The 1980 legislation 
22.54 Ultimately the campaign was successful, culminating in the passage of 
the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. Like restrictions placed on 
DLOs before, it was designed to force them to compete more with the private 
sector whilst fully aware that such competition could only be entered on terms 
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highly disadvantageous to the public sector. At the same time, the benefits 
brought to the industry by DLOs have been simply set aside. From the outset, 
DLOs have been committed not only to paying fair wages but also to providing 
secure employment in an industry where casualised forms of employment 
have always remained widespread. DLOs have also served a pioneering role in 
relation to other conditions of employment - in the inter-war period for 
example DLOs first paid for 'wet time', first introduced a 44-hour week as the 
norm, and first accepted the need for holiday pay which was not incorporated 
into the industry's working rule agreement until 1947. In addition DLOs have a 
far superior record with respect to health and safety and in the training of 
skilled labour. In 1980, the Health and Safety Executive's own figures show 38 
'reportable' accidents per 1,000 employees in construction nationally; this 
compares with a figure of 26 per 1,000 employees in the GLC's DLO. 
22.55 Specifically, the 1980 Act requires DLOs to keep separate accounts for 
each of four different categories of work (general highways; new construction 
over £50,000, under £50,000; and maintenance work); they must publish 
annual accounts and reports; and achieve a rate of return on capital specified by 
the Secretary of State in each of the accounting divisions of their operations. 
Local authorities are required to put out to tender (rather than award to the 
DLO by negotiation) all work above amounts prescribed in the regulations 
issued by the Secretary of State - who also has the power to close any DLO not 
achieving the specified rate of return on capital in three consecutive years. 
22.56 The most frequently heard justification for the Bill at the time of its 
introduction was that the measures were necessary to remove the advantages 
enjoyed by DLOs, that the effects of fair market competition would eradicate 
waste in the public sector and lead to increased efficiency across the industry as 
a whole. Equally often, it has been pointed out that the framework that has 
been created is not one of fair competition. DLOs cannot compete on an equal 
basis since they are unable to contract for work in the private sector. Nor are 
they able to make gains from property speculation - an important, some say 
the most important, source of returns for the private sector, quite apart from 
the profits of speculative building- as in office development. Third, the DLOs 
will be rendered less efficient since they will be less able to maintain a 
continuous flow of work associated with the use of plant and labour at full 
capacity. Unlike contractors they cannot cross subsidise less with more 
profitable types of work in order to maintain capacity utilisation, and they are 
required to earn 5% on capital employed regardless of the profitability 
prevailing in the private sector. 
22.57 In supporting the legislation the then Secretary of State, Michael 
Heseltine, made clear its underlying purpose: 'There is no doubt that these 
disciplines will result in a contraction of direct labour activities as local 
authorities come to appreciate the relative costs and advantages of direct labour 
and private contractors.' The full force of the regulations is only now beginning 
to register - yet even so the rate of contraction of direct labour may not have 
lived up to central government expectations. Between 1979 and 1982 
employment in DLOs fell by 13% as opposed to an 18% decline across the 
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industry as a whole. This may be one reason why the thresholds for 
compulsory tendering have been extended twice already, notwithstanding the 
absence of any chance to assess the impact of the previous regulations. The 
latest changes require 60% of small works and maintenance and 30% of 
highway works below £50,000 to go out to tender as from October 1983. 
22.58 Transfer of work from the public sector to the private, rather than the 
pursuit of cost-efficiency per se, appears to be the central aim of current 
government policy. In as much as the extension of tendering forces DLOs to 
compete on a simple cost-cutting basis against the private sector as a whole, it 
also increases the pressure to abandon the superior employment practices that 
DLOs have traditionally offered. As the London Borough of Harrow 
commented in its 1981-2 report on its DLO operations: 'The DLOs are 
observing the requirements of health and safety legislation which increases the 
cost of council work, making meaningful cost comparisons with private 
contractors difficult'. And the Haringey annual report observes: 'Given their 
less compassionate employment policies contractors have far greater flexibility 
in obtaining work than does the DLO. The Council, endeavouring to be good 
employers have refused to revert to "hire and fire" policies adopted by many 
contractors to overcome fluctuations in workload.' 
22 .59 The Hammersmith and Fulham report also notes that while small 
builders are at present interested in inherently low-profit repair and 
maintenance work, this situation would be unlikely to hold if there were any 
significant increase in overall demand in the industry. A public authority that 
dismantles its own capacity to carry out such work, in repair and maintenance 
as much as in new build, would lose its ability to apply a check on the escalation 
of tender prices submitted by private builders for council work. 
The role of London Community Builders 
22.60 The GLC must help to counteract the economic and political attacks on 
direct labour by giving increased support to its own DLO, London Community 
Builders, to achieve this goal. A formal requirement has been introduced to 
keep LCB informed of all work going out to tender from any of the GLC 
contracting departments. Similarly, where the GLC awards grants for capital 
works, it can stipulate as part of the conditions of the grant, that LCB be invited 
to tender. 
22.61 Given the public visibility of the GLC, it is important to be promoting 
improved conditions for local authority manual workers, within both LCB and 
.the substantial directly employed labour force maintaining GLC and ILEA 
· buildings. 
22.62 Secondly, LCB should be encouraged to extend the range of services it 
can provide, within the limitations of existing legislation. New areas which 
could be developed include: 
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(a) revised 'package improvement' and other upgrading schemes on 
housing estates for which the GLC retains statutory obligations; 
(b) the production of standardised components which would extend the 
operation of the joinery workshop in Vauxhall Cross; 
(c) training in specialist skills, e.g., those required in the restoration of 
historic buildings. This work has traditionally been contracted out to 
the private sector; 
(d) the inception of a specialist asbestos removal service; 
(e) the development of a more active equal opportunities strategy to 
improve LCB' s limited performance in increasing the rate of recruit-
ment of women and ethnic minorities into either established posts or 
training schemes. By July 1984, 16% of the workforce were members of 
ethnic minority groups . 
22 .63 Building maintenance has long been regarded as the essential market 
place of the small local contractor with all the problems of fragmentation that 
this entails. This is one of the reasons why there is still no generally accepted 
central body of knowledge for building maintenance from which local 
authorities and other major property owning organisations can draw. LCB 
with the support of the London borough DLOs and its own sophisticated 
maintenance control systems is admirably placed to fill this gap. 
22 .64 It is, however, still unfortunately true that whatever their success in 
achieving the status of exemplary enterprises, DLOs have had little effect on 
the industry as a whole which remains as backward as ever. This can only be 
rectified by Government intervention to legislate effectively for transformed 
working practices and conditions on an industry-wide basis. Workers within 
DLOs appreciate that their superior conditions are subject to erosion and that 
they must organise not only to defend these conditions but also to extend them 
to others. 
The role of the GLC 
Development and planning authority 
22.65 There is much the GLC is and can be doing within the scope of existing 
legislation. First, the GLC supports the campaign for the public ownership of 
building land in a form which gives much greater powers of positive planning 
to local authorities. There is little to be gained from taking building companies 
into public ownership given the expansion ofDLOs for, as we have seen, even 
the large companies constitute little more than organisations for the short-term 
speculative exploitation of a disorganised workforce and system of supply. At 
the moment, local authorities with insufficent finance have been increasingly 
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reduced to a negative function in the planning process - of being able to deny 
planning permission to some extent but being limited in their overall positive 
contribution to the construction of buildings and their environment. With local 
control of construction, local authorities could improve and transform the built 
environment. The GLC, for example, as a centralised co-ordinating authority, 
already possesses recognised expertise relating to every aspect of building and 
development activity. These range from extensive design, technical and 
research services, experience in housing, land and office management to 
almost 100 years of direct involvement in the production of buildings. 
Together, the GLC's combined resources far surpass the capacity of any 
borough authority or private contractor. If properly mobilised, they could be 
used to restructure relationships in the building industry that have traditional-
ly divided the client from the designer, the designer from the builder and each 
of these, in turn, from the final users, tenants and consumers who have been 
the true victims of a hopelessly inefficient system. 
Public sector building client 
22. 66 As a building client, the GLC awards contracts that probably make it the 
largest single source of employment for construction labour in London. 
Building work carried out for the Council in 1982-3, excluding work in civil 
engineering, highways and parks, amounted to £200 million (for new build and 
repair and maintenance combined). Work carried out for ILEA added a further 
£30 million to the total. Contracts of this value supported a substantial 
workforce, estimated at 8,000 in new build (with roughly 300 of these in ILEA) 
and 1,800 in repair and maintenance (1,200 of these in ILEA). The Council's 
civil engineering work (including highway construction and maintenance of 
roads tunnels and bridges), contributed a further £61 million and employed an 
additional 3,000 workers in schemes administered by the boroughs. 
Altogether, the GLC and ILEA provided employment for almost 13,000 people 
on construction and civil engineering sites over 1982-3. 
22.67 The scale of its building programme is large enough to accommodate 
changing priorities within the Council. For example, as part of its policy to 
increase industrial employment in London and to bring disused property back 
into use, the current administration has initiated an expanded industrial 
building programme which will, upon completion, provide floorspace for over 
3,500 jobs in almost 800 industrial units. Eight of these schemes (creating 500 
job opportunities) have been undertaken jointly with borough councils. The 
conversion and development work associated with properties purchased by 
the Greater London Enterprise Board to house an additional 4,000 jobs should 
also expand building work by 2,500 jobs a year. 
Innovative labour practices 
22. 68 The Council is also well placed to intervene more directly in the delivery 
of labour services on GLC sites. For example, the Council could set up its own 
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labour exchange, engaging directly in the provision of necessary 8kills, in 
co-operation with the building unions, employer organisations and the Greater 
London Training Board. 
22 .69 A centralised agency could manage both the training and distribution of 
skilled labour on a scale appropriate to the Council's programme of work. The 
overall organisation of site operations, including the sequence of trades on site, 
might still, where necessary, be left to the private builder or project 
management team given control of the work. The Council, however, would be 
able to nominate trades or a fixed proportion of work to be directly employed 
from its own register. Offering direct employment, the GLC would then be able 
to endorse conditions of work and pay (including holiday-with-pay schemes, 
pensions, wet time payments, etc.) that were commensurate with conditions 
prevailing within its own DLO. Such a labour exchange could also guarantee a 
sufficient supply of skilled labour to meet the requirements of the DLO. Finally, 
the proposal for a labour exchange would serve to strengthen existing Council 
efforts to discourage the increasingly widespread use of self-employed and 
labour only subcontracting in London. In this way it would serve to 
compensate for the inherent limitations of an approach which seeks to control 
employment abuses solely through adjustments in contract clauses. 
22.70 The Council will also undertake, in its capacity as exemplary client, to 
improve the conditions of work for those 13,000 workers currently employed 
on GLC projects. These changes fall into two main categories; first, those that 
affect the organisations of work and conditions of employment and secondly, 
those that effect the quality of work produced. 
22.71 By extending its own Code of Practice, the GLC could increase its 
control of employment practices on GLC sites in accord with current policy. A 
recent revision in the code, for example, requires all sub-contradors to be 
members of an approved trade association in order to exclude labour only 
subcontrattors and to allow trade union access to the site. Much greater use 
could be made of similar clauses to discriminate in favour of approved practices 
while discouraging the most severe abuses of the contracting system (like the 
lump). The Code could also be adapted to further the strategic policy of the 
Council in other areas. If, for example, plans materialise to set up a large scale 
public sector supplier of building materials in the Royal Docks, GLC contracts 
could require contractors to place purchasing orders with its own supplier, 
wherever possible. The code could also stipulate minimum trainee ratios . 
22. 72 A few London boroughs have recently introduced an experimental 
scheme requiring contractors in their employ to advance a sum of money before 
work commences on site. This is set aside to cover all outstanding payments 
due to the workforce in the event of their employer defaulting on obligations 
before the successful completion of the work as contracted. In the past, when a 
contractor has declared bankruptcy, it often turns out that both employee and 
employer National Insurance contributions have been withheld from Inland 
Revenue for a period of several months or even years. The same applies to taxes 
as well. Building workers normally have no protection against this abuse since 
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they receive their pay net of taxes and all other contributions and therefore 
have no means of knowing whether or not their employer has been forwarding 
these payments to the Inland Revenue. 
22. 73 Missing contributions, however, may mean loss of entitlement to either 
employment, sickness or disablement benefit. In the case of sudden 
bankruptcies, the gap in maintaining contributions is obviously critical since 
unemployment is an inevitable consequence of bankruptcy. Given the 
disproportionately high risks borne by building workers under this arrange-
ment, the introduction of a special fund to minimise them would effectively 
offer increased protection to building operatives working on GLC contracts. 
22.74 The GLC's Contract Compliance Unit has attempted to eliminate firms 
from its tender list that do not comply with recommended safety procedures 
within the terms of the Health and Safety legislation. But this legislation is 
primariiy oriented towards accident prevention, rather than compensation. 
Though employers are required by law to provide employers' liability cover for 
their workers, claims made against this type of insurance succeed only when 
the firm involved admits some responsibility for the accident, e.g. through 
negligence or lack of proper supervision, both extremely difficult to establish. 
On top of this, trade union support is often required both to inform an injured 
worker of the procedures involved in making a claim and to provide the 
financial backing necessary to initiate legal proceedings. Given the low level of 
unionisation on building sites, it is not surprising to discover that the claims 
rate among building workers (especially those in small firms) is significantly 
lower than in other industries despite the higher accident rate. 
22.75 To compensate for the poor support offered to workers injured on site, 
the GLC could introduce a further compulsory insurance scheme. Personal 
accident insurance would not provide compensation of the sort covered by 
employers' liability but would instead maintain a worker's income while 
recovering from an accident without the need to establish liability. Effectively, 
it would act as a no-fault insurance scheme, saving the time and money 
involved in painful and protracted legal battles and, at the same time, 
protecting the standard of living of the worker's family. 
Maintaining quality control 
22.76 A third area that would benefit from direct intervention by the GLC as 
building client is control of the quality of building work. Since the abolition of 
Parker Morris housing standards in April 1981, the DOE no longer vets 
prospective housing schemes on the basis of their standards (for space, comfort 
or convenience) but only on the basis of their unit costs. Consequently, no data 
are collected any more on the standards of accommodation that have actually 
been provided since that date. 
22.77 On the basis of the little evidence that is available so far, standards have 
been declining as expected (Barratt Solo Flats built in Scotland have been 
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condemned in.Parliament as 'rabbit hutches' and 'not fit to live in'). With the 
threat of extensive new private housebuilding in the green belt, the question of 
standards becomes an urgent one. 
22.78 The GLC can respond to this in several important ways. First, it can 
continue to insist on the maintenance of high housing standards in both its own 
new build and in repair and maintenance work, starting with the retention of 
Parker Morris space standards on all new housing work. Additionally, it can 
insist on the satisfactory provision of access for the disabled and on the 
inclusion of childcare facilities in its new industrial schemes. In work 
contracted out to private firms it can, through specifications, continue to rely 
on high quality long-life and safe materials. From 1 September 1983, asbestos 
has been excluded from all GLC specifications. Lead has also been prohibited. 
22.79 To minimise the potential for poor workmanship and scamped work on 
its own contracts, the GLC might consider an extension of the defects liability 
clause in its standard form of contract, to make the builder responsible for work 
carried over a much longer period than at present. This might be appropriate 
for new build schemes in addition to repair and maintenance work. It would 
inhibit builders from substituting cheaper materials if these would need repair 
before the expiration of the liability period. 
22.80 The current government has.also announced its intention to alter 
traditional procedures governing the use of building regulations. Currently, 
most building work must conform to these regulations; they control 
construction methods and materials, including light and ventilation, stan-
dards, sanitation and drainage, energy conservation, etc. The regulations have 
traditionally been enforced by building control officers of the local council 
except in inner London where it is done by GLC District Surveyors. This has 
been provided as a public service, in the interests of maintaining public health. 
Outside London, it was free until the government imposew·fee for it in 1980. 
22.81 The White Paper The Future of Building Control in England and Wales 
proposes two kinds of change, both of which have implications for current GLC 
practice. First, in line with its general policy to encourage privatisation, it 
proposes the introduction of a scheme to allow approved experts in the private 
sector to take over some of the work traditionally carried out by local and 
district authority building inspectors. Without stipulating the training or other 
necessary qualifications that would be required, it argues that such an 
arrangement would encourage an opportunity for maximum self-regulation by 
the building industry and the professions. In other words, the White Paper is 
proposing a scheme for self-certification, on the grounds that savings arising. 
from a reduced dependence on outdated and unwieldy bureaucratic 
machinery would more than outweigh the loss of impartiality guaranteed by 
the current system. Approved private professionals would, under the 
proposed arrangements, be available as an optional alternative to local 
authority inspection of plans and construction work. 
22.82 The London District Surveyors have tended to be more highly qualified 
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than many local building officers and to insist on more rigid adherence to the 
Building Regulations than building inspectors in other areas. (Currently, they 
are required to pass an exam set by the GLC). Some private developers have, in 
fact, been known to avoid certain areas in London because of the stringent 
standards which the local DS would insist upon. Under the new scheme, these 
developers would be able to avoid a more demanding OS and apply instead to 
an approved certifier of their own choice. 
22.83 The high quality of London's building standards would be further 
undermined by the White Paper's proposal to merge inner London's Building 
Regulations with those forming the National Regulations. Though the two sets 
of regulations do not quite cover the same ground (there are, for example, no 
sound or thermal insulation requirements in London) where they do overlap, 
London's standards are generally higher. Although the stated intention is to 
create some alignment between the two sets of byela"l<'.rs, it would be surprising 
if this did not involve some relaxation of the more stringent standards applying 
in London. 
Housing standards 
22. 84 In the long-term, some form of minimum housing standards will almost 
certainly need to be re-introduced. Parker Morris standards remained in force 
for 15 years. They replaced an earlier generation of recommended standards 
brought in after the war by the Dudley Report. The Dudley recommendations, 
in turn, superceded the Tudor Walters Report which appeared after the First 
World War. So the tradition of a continuing revision and adaptation of 
standards is a long one. For each generation of change, a government 
committee took evidence from a wide range of voluntary organisations to 
assess the effects that the intervening 20 or 30 years had wrought on the way 
people organised their lives at home. The current government does not seem 
likely to initiate such a project since they are committed to reducing rather than 
increasing public intervention in housing. 
22.85 It might then fall to the GLC to assume responsibility for reviving 
government commitment to the maintenance of living standards as reflected in 
public sector housing. The GLC is ideally placed to organise and carry out a 
London-wide forum on housing standards. This would involve the collection 
and evaluation of evidence submitted by a wide range of tenant groups from 
both the public and private sectors. It would also provide a much needed 
opportunity to define the housing needs of special groups (in particular the 
disabled, elderly and single parents) by assessing in a systematic way the 
alternative types of accommodation that have been offered to them over the 
past decade. Various alternative experimental solutions could then be 
designed and built by the GLC and evaluated by the tenants occupying them 
before any new standards were formally adopted. 
22.86 The GLC has initiated its own research into the standards of housing 
that have been achieved by London boroughs since compulsory standards 
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were abandoned in 1981. With plans ·of new build schemes contributed by 
London's local authority architects' departments, the GLC is currently 
developing a composite picture of the quality of new housing provision, by 
comparison with the typical standards prevailing before extreme cost 
constraints were introduced. Plans are being appraised against a comprehen-
sive DOE checklist of user needs that registers the design inputs into domestic 
planning. Information has also been elicited on the changing balance of design 
work between that carried out by borough architects and that awarded to 
private consultants. A recent controversial report commissioned jointly by the 
Treasury and the Property Services Agency, concluded that design work 
carried out for public sector clients by private design consultants is 20% more 
expensive than work carried out by an integrated in-house design team. It 
argued that privatisation of the design of government building would cost the 
taxpayer as much as one-third more than if current public sector design staff 
were maintained. Despite this, th€ government is currently planning to extend 
privatisation of local government services into new areas by bringing them 
under the umbrella of the 1980 Planning and Land Act. Architects Departments 
are certainly prime candidates for this treatment. 
Greater London Maintenance Plan 
22.87 The GLC's long-standing commitment to promoting the preservation 
of London (through its Historic Buildings Division) will be greatly expanded to 
consider a strategy for the long-term maintenance of all London building stock. 
Until now, there has been no systematic or co-ordinated attempt to determine 
the age breakdown and condition of the built environment along the lines 
achieved for housing (like the GLC House Condition Survey). Without such 
data to draw on, it has been impossible to plan effectively for the long-term 
renewal of the urban fabric (buildings plus infrastructure). Developing a 
Greater London Maintenance Plan would switch the emphasis away from 
'Development' where building replacement is often determined by narrow 
economic criteria rather than by any consideration of the natural building 
lifespans. Where rising land values force the redevelopment of a site in order to 
realise speculative gain, building stock in good repair is too often sacrificed. 
The Maintenance Plan would highlight the waste of resources involved in such 
redevelopment and would consider alternative means by which this might be 
controlled and planned maintenance for the long-term promoted. 
Contracts compliance and the register of firms 
22.88 The GLC Contracts Compliance Unit has begun work on the 
establishment of a computerised file of all 4,000 contractors currently on the 
Council's approved lists. Eventually, each firm will be individually evaluated 
on the basis of its written response to a GLC questionnaire. The questionnaire 
has been designed to find out what opportunities exist for the employment of 
women and workers from ethnic minorities and to ferret out each firm's 
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attitude towards safety and labour practices on site, in order to check for 
possible violations of the GLC's existing code of practice, including, for 
example, the use of labour only subcontractors. To date, a representative 
sample of 1,000 firms has been canvassed from the full list. Results received so 
far have been vetted for their compliance with the goals mentioned above. 
Labour practices have also been vetted on selected GLC sites. 
22.89 There is considerable scope for widening the range of this register. At 
the moment, positive vetting is based primarily on the written testimony of 
responding firms. While useful in focussing employers' attention on the 
conditions of GLC contracts, this kind of evidence can offer no guarantee of the 
contractor's future compliance nor does it offer any hard information on the 
firm's past performance. To establish a fuller profile requires the inclusion of 
additional information on past contractual relations between the GLC and the 
contractor. This might include, for each contract, the value of the accepted 
tender and the final contract price, the estimated and actual length of contract, 
the claims record over the course of the job and any special features ( e.g. early 
completion or, at the other extreme, defaulting on the contract before 
completion, bankruptcy, labour disputes and accidents on site). Information of 
this type would add another dimension to the policy statements elicited from 
the questionnaire and would provide a much more comprehensive basis on 
which to evaluate any firm's prospective performance. 
22 .90 In addition to upgrading the calibre of firms on its own list the GLC, in 
its role as strategic authority, will provide assistance in this area to all London 
boroughs. It is well documented that a considerable number of subcontracting 
firms undertake work for more than one London borough. For example, on 
London local authority new housing sites that were active in 1980, there were at 
least 65 different subcontracting firms that had been nominated and employed 
by more than one borough. While each local authority keeps its own list of 
approved firms and a detailed record of each contract, no centralised file yet 
exists that registers the performance of firms across all boroughs in the Greater 
London area. In the absence of such a file, firms defaulting on contracts in one 
borough have been known to turn up shortly thereafter on contracts in a 
neighbouring borough. In effect, these firms are relying on the lack of 
communication between boroughs for the maintenance of their workload. This 
ignorance costs London dearly, in terms of the remedial costs incurred in the 
rebuilding or repairing of scamped or unfinished work. The GLC has, for 
instance, been known to employ contractors that have been debarred from the 
approved lists of one or more of London's district authorities, at great cost to 
the ratepayers. 
22.91 The GLC is well placed to establish a London-wide register of firms. It is 
a job that could only be undertaken by a centralised authority, because of the 
scale and scope of its operation. At the moment, local authorities have little 
means of checking on the history of unfamiliar firms who apply for inclusion in 
council lists. This, in part, explains their repeated nomination of the same firms 
on successive contracts. One study of London housing sites found that 
two-thirds of the nominated subcontractors had been previously nominated by 
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the same borough. Though the entire workforce could be completely new on 
each contract the firm, at least on its managerial side, is already known to the 
local authority. With little else to aid in the selection of suitable firms, the 
Council is forced to depend on the minimal evidence it can muster. 
22.92 The establishment of a London-wide register would also act as an 
incentive to firms wishing to improve their reputation in the public sector. 
Their visibility would be raised considerably which would, of course, benefit 
exemplary firms as much as it would harm inadequate ones. In either case, it 
would, over time, increase their accountability to the rate-payer. 
Centre of research and technological innovation 
22 .93 The Technical Policy Division at the GLC, which helped to engineer the 
prohibition on lead and asbestos, will be encouraged to continue its leading 
role in the testing and monitoring of new materials, one that has proved 
invaluable to local authorities, building contractors and governments overseas 
who lack its centralised research capacity. It is, for example, currently 
monitoring the construction of 32 timber-frame houses and has produced an 
interim report on its findings. It also carries out research on alternative building 
methods and has undertaken experiments (like the flat roof trials at Bevis Farm) 
that only an authority of the size of the GLC could afford to conduct. In 
addition, the GLC publishes a set of standard specifications which is unique in 
being upgraded annually to take into account regular changes in the 
state-of-the-art. These are sold widely, along with publications on housing 
layout and standard dwelling plans. 
22 .94 The computer group operating within the Technical Policy Division has 
recently installed the most advanced computer-aided draughting system in 
Britain (CADAM). Already the UK's largest and most experienced user the 
GLC has trained more than 70 employees in its use, concentrating on the 
production of contract drawings. In this area, it has achieved considerable 
savings in time allowing, for example, drawings for the GLC's new housing in 
Feltham to be produced in half the time normally required, and enabling 
inappropriate or inaccurate details discovered on site to. be respecified and 
redrawn immediately, thereby minimising disruptions in building work. 
22.95 The use of CADAM, properly developed, can prevent the loss of 
investment through capital underspend. By encouraging more efficient and 
more evenly distributed use of staff time, CADAM reduces the possibility of 
losing work by failing to reach contract stage by the required deadline. In this 
way, it can help to protect jobs in construction by increasing efficiency in the 
pre-contract phase. 
22.96 The GLC's CADAM set-up has already drawn considerable interest 
from a large number of organisations in the construction industry including, in 
the public sector, the London Boroughs of Hackney, Greenwich and Lambeth; 
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Derbyshire, Cleveland and Wiltshire County Councils; Wessex Water 
Authority and British Rail; and in the private sector, Arup Association and 
Tesco. Overseas organisations in the USA, Finland, Israel, Hong Kong and 
Australia have also been given advice. IBM has asked the GLC to consider 
taking on all of its UK training which.would inYolve a wide range of industrial 
users such as British Leyland, Vauxhall Motors, British Shipbuilders and the 
National Coal Board. This is an area where the GLC could operate a profitable 
consultancy while at the same time contributing to the creation of skilled 
employment in the industry. The Computer Unit estimates that with 
appropriate support from the Council, it could train up to 250 people a year. 
22 .97 Unfortunately such a consultancy violates existing legislation which 
prohibits the Council from trading at a profit. This prohibition, however, 
directly contradicts the Department of Industry's current efforts to promote a 
wider use of CAD AM throughout Britain and representations need to be made 
to secure its removal. 
22 .98 Over the longer term, CADAM could also be applied to the 
comprehensive mapping of all of London. The GLC is already giving financial 
support to the Ordnance Survey Unit to produce digitised maps of the entire 
London area that could be adapted to any computerised system. Using these 
maps as a base, an extensive data bank could be developed along lines already 
available in Austria, to cover corresponding information for each local area on 
the infrastructure, historic buildings, rateable value, transport network, 
ownership and age profile of the building stock. Eventually, this would 
provide an invaluable resource for community groups and other organisations 
threatened with (re)development. Paris is currently considering embarking on 
such a scheme; London (through the GLC) should follow suit. The GLC already 
possesses much of the information that would be incorporated - another 
reason it is uniquely qualified to undertake the project. Its Historic Buildings 
division, for example, keeps watch on almost 30,000 listed buildings, including 
1,000 which the GLC owns itself. Historians working on the GLC's Survey of 
London have amassed a vast amount of information from primary sources and 
work together with skilled draughtsmen to produce an invaluable stock of 
measured drawings of London buildings. 
22.99 The policies proposed here, both in their scope and detail and in the 
extent to which they have already been carried out, are an apt testimony to the 
historical role and continuing potential for the GLC and the public sector to take 
a leading role in housing and construction. The truth is that private capital 
cannot and never has performed satisfactorily in this area. The legacy of 
building failures arising from the use of inadequately tested systems or 
materials (like high alumina cement), from shoddy workmanship and 
skimping on details (ruinous, for example, to timber-frame housing) and from 
sites abandoned mid-contract all attest to the premium placed on speed at any 
cost. This is an inevitable consequence of the high risks associated with 
building activity, financed by borrowed capital to unrealistic deadlines. The toll 
this takes on the cost and quality of the final product, the health and safety of 
the workforce and the day to day housing conditions of tenants has been 
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unacceptably high. It makes a nonsense of the monetarist ideology that seeks to 
restore an efficiency - that has never existed - to construction by the rule of 
the market. 
Proposals for action 
1. The GLC will campaign for the repeal of legislative restrictions on 
tendering/trading activities of Direct Labour Organisations. 
2. The GLC will also campaign for new legislation enabling DLOs to trade 
on equal terms with private firms engaged in the same area of work. It is not 
enough to remove the crippling restrictions imposed by the 1980 Planning and 
Land Act. This would still leave DLOs' sphere of operations confined to work 
financed by their employing authority. They must also be given the power to 
extend their range of building activity beyond their traditional sphere of 
housing and repair and maintenance and beyond artifically limited 
geographical boundaries by competing for work in other sectors and for other 
clients. Only in this way can the public sector develop into a visible - and 
meaningful - presence in the construction industry at large. 
3. The GLC will campaign for the municipal ownership and control of 
building land. 
4. The GLC, as a strategic authority and under its existing powers, will 
maintain the level and quality of training for the long term future needs of the 
industry, through: 
(a) an expansion in the workload of its own DLO, and 
(b) through an increase in the resources of the Greater London Training 
Board 
(i) to prevent the loss of skills associated with the overall decline 
in building activity 
(ii) to counteract the degredation of work arising from the recent 
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replacement of apprenticeships with fragmented 'skills-
testing', and 
(iii) to promote the greater employment of ethnic minorities and 
women in the building trades. 
5. The GLC will help to develop a London-wide register of firms, accessible 
to all local authorities, based on the GLC's own experience in setting up a 
Contracts Compliance Unit. 
6. The GLC will act as an exemplary employer of labour, by improving 
conditions of employment not only in its own DLO (London Community 
Builders) but also for the much larger number of building operatives 
employed on GLC contracts (estimated at approximately 10,000). 
7. The GLC will act as a forum for the development of a new generation of 
improved housing standards replacing Parker Morris whose compulsory 
status was lifted by the government in 1981; it will continue to set high 
standards for all its own new housebuilding in line with policy in the revised 
Greater London Development Plan; it will maintain its high level of research 
into new building and materials standards and into areas of social policy that 
have a bearing on the design of housing. 
8. The GLC will promote the use of flexible design technology, as embodied 
in CAD AM (Computer Aided Design); the GLC is currently the largest single 
UK user and could take on a major training role in this area within the public 
sector. 
9. The GLC will promote more democratic control of design by establishing 
formal consultation procedures at an early stage with: 
(a) tenants or other final users or consumers 
(b) relevant branches within the Council concerned with, e.g. , disability, 
ethnic minorities, building organisation and technology. 
10. The GLC will argue for the retention of building control in London by 
GLC District Surveyors whose high standards of inspection have provided 
much greater protection to ratepayers than can be expected from the 
self-certified inspectors proposed by government. 
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11. As an extension of this the GLC will encourage the development, among 
London boroughs, of a register and performance bonding of small local 
builders engaged in improvement work whether grant-aided or not, to offer 
some protection to otherwise defenceless householders (particularly single 
people and the elderly) against unscrupulous 'cowboy' traders. 
12. The GLC will strengthen its role as a strategic housing authority in order 
to pursue redistributive goals beyond the powers of individual boroughs 
through, e.g., the Greater London Mobility Scheme. 
13. The GLC will take on a strategic role in the formulation of a long-term 
forward programme for the renewal and rebuilding of London's infrastruc-
ture with a view to the economic and redistributive impact of such 
inves trnen t. 
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Retail warehouse 011 the site of the Firestone facton; in Brentford, 
reflecting west London's industrial change .. 011 the other side of the 
road can be seen the closed Pyrene fire extinguisher factory, now 
being converted into offices. 
Phutu: CLC. 
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Heathrow 
and West London 
Summary 
1. London's Heathrow Airport continues to be the number one port for 
visible trade, by either sea or air, in the UK. Preparations for the threatened 
privatisation of British Airways and Heathrow itself have already hit hard at 
employment in west London; they indicate the probable scale of future job 
loss following their sale to the private sector. Moreover the plans for 
privatisation neglect the need for a co-ordinated strategy for the air transport 
industry in Britain; have made it impossible for the government to make 
rational decisions regarding the need for a fifth terminal at Heathrow or an 
expanded airport at Stansted; and have reduced the options to questions of the 
private profitability of each part. 
2. The increasing dominance of Heathrow in west London has not, as is 
sometimes claimed, always worked to improve employment prospects in the 
area. Employment at the airport itself has declined dramatically since 1979, 
mainly as a result of cuts in jobs by British Airways, who have attempted to 
resolve problems of profitability by cutting jobs and contracting out work. In 
the four years to 1983 over 13,500 jobs have been lost at Heathrow including a 
42% cut in British Airways engineering division. These cuts and the 
sub-contracting of work have led to a reduction in wages, worsening of 
conditions, an intensification of work and a reduction in services. 
3. Outside of the airport, in west London, rising property and land values 
and the demand for warehousing and office space linked to the airport's needs 
have contributed to the massive loss of manufacturing jobs in the local area. 
West London has over 5,000,000 sq.ft. of empty warehouse space. Heathrow, 
however, does not only generate a demand for warehouses. It also still 
provides many jobs, it attracts high-technology industrial development as 
well as office ahd hotel development to serve the business community which 
passes through Heathrow. 
4. The GLC's policy, therefore, is to work with the trade unions concerned 
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and other groups to oppose the plans for privatisation. Successful opposition 
to privatisation is a necessary precondition for any rational plan for civil air 
transport as a whole. In the longer term the GLC will work towards such a 
plan, to ensure that decisions about civil air transport also work to the benefit 
of the people who live and work in London. 
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Heathrow 
23.01 In 1984 London's Heathrow Airport continued to be the number one 
port for visible sea or air trade by value, in the United Kingdom. In 1983-4 
Heathrow's trading profit increased by 10% to £50.3 million. In the previous 
year Heathrow and Gatwick dealt with no less than 86% of all the passengers 
handled by the British Airports Authority (BAA) and with Stansted as well 
accounted for over 93 per cent of BAA cargo handling. 
23.02 The British Airports Authority also spends sums of considerable 
importance to the economy of London. In 1982-3 the expenditure of Heathrow 
and Gatwick Airports was £145.6 million and £53.5 million respectively. In 
addition there is a capital expenditure programme; for the five-year period 
1983-88, this is estimated at £168.3 million for Heathrow, £170.9 million for 
Gatwick and, depending upon the government's decision regarding develop-
ment, £175 million for Stansted. The combined Heathrow-Gatwick-Stansted 
capital expenditure programme of £514.2 million, when added to the annual 
income and expenditure of the London airports, represents a major potential 
input by the London BAA sites into the local regional economy. 
23.03 Heathrow's profitability and importance and British Airways' com-
manding position within British civil air transport must not be equated with 
increased employment opportunities within London or even within the 
confines of the airport. For Heathrow, on-airport employment peaked in the 
financial year 1979-80 when over 57,000 people were employed. The rapid 
decline to the 1982-3 figure of 43,675 represents a reduction in employment of 
over 23% in only four years. The change in Heathrow's working population is 
largely attributable to the reduction in airline employees. At Heathrow, airline 
employees have been reduced from 43,313 in 1979-80 to 30,458 in 1982-3, nearly 
a 30% reduction in four years. British Airways is typical and accounts for the 
bulk of the job loss, with over 23,000 workers dismissed nationally- a 35% cut 
in airline staff between 1979 and March 1983. 
23.04 Estimates of employment opportunities in the near future offer little 
prospect of regaining the high job levels at Heathrow which existed during the 
1970's and before. BA's massive job cuts were still 2,000 short of their target 
levels and further losses must be anticipated following privatisation. The 
opening of Terminal 4 will largely involve the transfer of existing staff from 
other parts of the Airport. The BAA has already stated that not all existing posts 
will be replaced following the transfer. In fact Terminal 4 and the prospect of 
Terminal 5 offer every opportunity for the introduction of high capital 
investment in new technology designed to replace present labour in many 
areas of cargo and passenger handling. In 1974, a west Londoner could always 
get a job at Heathrow Airport. A decade later in 1984, 80 clerical posts attracted 
20,000 applicants. 
23.05 The impact of the airport upon the local economy cannot, however, be 
viewed simply in terms of direct employment gains and losses, nor solely in 
terms of those industries involved in airport-related activities. The growth and 
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development of Heathrow Airport has been a major contributor to the massive 
increase in property and land values in west London. This in turn is directly 
related to the closure of major manufacturing plants in the area and the growth 
of speculative office and warehouse developments, which service the demands 
of the airport but do not replace the jobs lost for the local population. 
23. 06 The growth of the west London economy at a time when the Docklands 
of east London were in decline has also served to increase the differential 
between west and east London. The development of the 'Western Corridor', 
centred upon Heathrow and the M4, has witnessed the growth of office 
developments and new technology industry within outer west London and 
beyond. The very existence of the airport has, therefore, decisively changed the 
contours of property and land values in London and the rest of south-east 
England. 
23.07 Heathrow and air transport have been a central influence on 
employment, industry, and the property economy of west London and 
beyond. There are four issues of central concern: 
(a) the impact that the market economy has had on the number and type of 
jobs, and the level of wages, of those linked in to the airport economy; 
(b) the prospect that privatisation will further depress employment and 
wages, and work against the long term planning of the region's air 
transport; 
(c) the decision on where the expansion forecast for London's airports by 
the end of the decade will go: a fifth terminal at Heathrow, Stansted, or 
regional airports in the north; 
(d) the continuing impact of Heathrow on the robustness of west 
London's industrial economy. 
We will deal with each in turn. 
Job losses and prospects 
23.08 The job losses that have occurred at Heathrow over the last five years 
have been caused in part by a crisis in the international airline industry, and in 
part by the imposition of short-term balance sheet criteria on British Airways, 
in preparation for privatisation. 
23.09 In 1979 BA anticipated an 87% increase in passenger handling from 16 
to 30 million, a doubling of cargo handling and a comparatively small reduction 
in staffing of 3.5°10 from 57,500 to 55,500 by 1985. What actually happened was 
that, by mid-1984, there had been an actual decline in passenger and cargo 
handling and a massive reduction of over 23,000 jobs. Between 1978-9 and 
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1982-3 passengers moved by BA fell by 1.1 million and tonnes of freight carried 
fell by 23~~. 
23.10 In the financial year 1979-80 the airlines were geared up for an increase 
in demand. Yet in that year British Airways' fuel bill rose by 77%, interestrates 
rose dramatically at the ,·ery. time when the airlines had borrowed heavily to 
cover the cost of new aircraft and equipment; and competition on North 
Atlantic routes in particular reduced air fares as demand fell significantly. The 
heavy capital investment and reduced revenue resulted in the closure of 
routes, worsening of services and massive job losses. Within four years these 
changes affecting civil air transport have resulted in unprecedented rises in 
operating costs, a marked fall in revenue in real terms, under-utilisation of 
expensive equipment and major job losses. 
23.11 In order to return the company to a profit-making position BA have 
undertaken drastic measures including the massive reduction in staffing, the 
closure of international routes, the disposal of aircraft and the cargo fleet, the 
disposal of two engineering bases, a moratorium on rises in basic pay, 
widespread cuts in administrative services, the transfer of catering activities to 
outside contractors, the selling of a profitable subsidiary company (Internation-
al Aeradio) and the suspension and closure of the airline's engineering 
apprentice scheme based in west London. 
23.12 Take engineering as an example. In 1980 12,076 staff were employed 
within the engineering division; this had been reduced by March 1983 to 6,994, 
a 42% cut in skilled blue-collar jobs. The absolute reduction in numbers directly 
employed by BA also masks the sub-contracting of services previously 
provided within the airport perimeter by directly employed BA and BAA 
employees. They have been replaced, in part, by a casualised workforce, 
generally working in non-unionised firms for lower wages, with worse 
conditions of work, and longer hours. 
23.13 Similarly, during the last three years airport and airline catering and 
cleaning services have been sub-contracted to a number of firms; and 
installation work by directly employed BA craft workers of building and plant 
maintenance departments has been sub-contracted, at the cost of 1,200 craft 
jobs. 
23.14 In the case of the North Side Catering at Heathrow, workers have 
suffered a 50% reduction in wages since the service has been sub-contracted 
away from BA. In cleaning at Heathrow, Asian women, particularly those 
working for sub-contractors have also experienced cuts in wages, worsening of 
conditions and intensification of work as well as personal harassment and 
continual abuse from their employers. Many of these workers are employed on 
a casual basis so that their employers can avoid paying redundancy entitlement 
and sick pay. 
23.15 These changes have served to improve British Airways' balance sheets. 
But they have served to break up one of the outstanding groups of skilled 
596 London Industrial Strategy ~ Heathrow and West London 
engineers in London, they have run down training and opened themselves up 
to skill shortages in the future, and they have increased the problems of 
reliability and quality control which have tended to come from an extension of 
sub-contracting on the scale witnessed at Heathrow. 
23.16 The massive job losses at Heathrow and British Airways since 1979 are 
the response to changes in the structure of the world-wide civil air transport 
industry. They reflect changes in demand, rising operating costs and 
technological change. But the particular response that British Airways made to 
these problems must be seen in the context of the government's announcement 
in 1979 that BA would be privatised. For this to be possible, the accounts had to 
be turned round. With staff costs accounting for 42% of the Company's 
operating expenditure (1982-3 figures), cuts in direct staffing were one of the 
easiest immediate economies - regardless of the effect these cuts would have 
on the workforce, or on the long term quality of services of British Airways 
itself. 
Privatisation and its significance for air transport 
development 
23.17 Quite apart from the attack on the jobs, wages and conditions of 
employees, British Airways' strategy over the past five years has been geared 
above all - as their Chairman Lord King put it - to make the airline attractive 
to private investors. In 1981-2 for example, when they had declared a loss of 
£544 million, they wrote down the value of their airline fleet in their books in 
order to reduce future depreciation charges and increase the future rate of 
profit. The Financial Times commented that BA' spending capital reconstruction 
risked being seen more as a marketing exercise than an attempt to establish a 
realistic capital structure. Then in 1984 BA revalued the value of that same 
airline fleet upwards by £102 million, when depreciation costs and current 
profitability had become secondary to the need to demonstrate substantial 
assets to a potential purchaser. 
23 .18 BA has then re-organised itself as if it were a private, profit-maximising 
company. What concerns the commercial airline industry is that when the 
company is privatised it will behave as an aggressive private monopoly with 
even more serious effects on competitors than if it had remained a public one. 
The problematic future of the industry has been highlighted by the publication 
of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) proposals on the future of the UK airline 
network. The review has even been heralded by the private sector of civil air 
transport as possibly the last chance for 20 years to restructure the commercial 
airline industry in Britain, on the grounds that the stated goal of increased 
competition is illusory and that BA, once privatised, will establish itself as an 
unassailable private monopoly. This view was endorsed by airline industry 
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lawyers acting independently and not under instruction from any client; in 
September 1984 they made a statement to the government warning: 
... that if the CAA's recommendations are not wholly or substantially 
accepted (in particular, the underlying recommendation that it is given a 
direct duty to secure the sound development of the industry), the CAA will 
suffer a serious loss of authority and credibility as a body strong enough to 
stand up for British civil aviation as a whole against any sectional interest 
from within. 
23.19 In fact it is clear that privatisation of civil air transport in Britain cannot 
in any beneficial sense increase competition between British airlines or 
airports. The industry is, in any case, regulated on an international basis. The 
selling off of these nationalised interests would lead to a monopoly by private 
enterprise within Britain, with all the associated disadvantages attached to this 
condition. With the regulatory powers of the CAA weakened and BA' s 
monopoly position undiminished, there would be little to stop BA, once 
privatised, destroying its competitors. 
23 .20 Even under the government's plan to deregulate UK domestic routes by 
granting additional licences, the existing smaller private airlines could only 
survive by reproducing the effects of deregulation that have occurred in the 
United States. Observers are of the opinion that US airline employees have lost 
more than $1 ,000 million in wages and workrule concessions during the last 
two years in order to help keep near-bankrupt airlines flying and themselves in 
a job. The industry has' .. retrogressed under deregulation by every measure: 
health of the industry, stability of workforce, quality of workforce, number of 
cities served, and most importantly, the margin of safety on which lives 
depend.' 
23 .21 The selling of British Airways, the British Airports Authority and 
British Aerospace and the weakening of the powers of the Civil Aviation 
Authority will mean the end of any prospects for co-ordinated economic 
planning within the civil air transport and aerospace industries within Britain 
to the mutual benefit of the companies concerned. 
23.22 The question of privatisation in the civil air transport industries is a 
central issue in the development of a London industrial strategy. As 
nationalised companies, the British Airports Authority, British Airways and 
the Civil Aviation Authority could seek to secure a comprehensive and 
coherent strategy for the development of the industry in this country. Such a 
strategy would seek both to ensure the economic viability of these concerns and 
consider, in a non-partisan fashion, their relationship to other related 
industries, such as the airframe and aero-engine industries and in particular 
British Aerospace. This programme should also consider, in conjunction with 
the GLC and other local authorities, the social and economic implications of the 
development and restructuring of the industry within a local economy such as 
Greater London. 
23.23 Under the privatisation proposals these objectives would be impossible 
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to contemplate, let alone achieve. The resultant private companies would be 
unable, and probably unwilling, either to promote related industries, which 
did not increase their own corporate profits, or to consider wider social and 
economic effects . The preparation for the privatisation of BA has already 
illustrated the form that future developments will take: loss of jobs and training 
opportunities, worsening of conditions and wages and a reduction in services 
and long-term efficiency. 
London's Airports: the location of growth 
23.24 The debate over the siting of London's third airport dates back to the 
1960s and the work of the Roskill Commission. The present round of public 
inquiries and debate was initiated in December 1979, when an invitation was 
extended to the BAA by the Secretary of State for Trade to submit proposals for 
a new terminal at Stansted, capable of handling about 15 million passengers a 
year. 
23.25 The whole discussion has focussed on the alternative of developing 
Stansted or building a fifth terminal at Heathrow Airport. The BAA have opted 
for Stansted on the grounds that Heathrow will have reached near saturation 
when Terminal 4 opens in 1985. Consequently vital interline passengers, 
especially those on North Atlantic flights on route to Europe, could be lost 
permanently to airports in continental Europe if London were to prove 
incapable, even for a short period, of coping with their transfer facilities. 
23.26 British Airways argued differently . It said that the movement of flights 
from Heathrow to the opposite side of the capital would not only reduce the 
preference shown to London by international air travellers but also do great 
harm to the efficiency of British Airways as an airline. Foreign airlines, they 
argued, would refuse to transfer to Stansted, in the same manner as they had 
declined in recent years to relocate to Gatwick. Stansted, it was contended, was 
likely to prove a most unpopular airport for those passengers interlining on 
journeys which would necessitate transferring from one airport to another. 
23.27 The inspector's report of the public inquiry, published in December 
1984, has effectively supported both options by recommending the immediate 
development of a single runway airport at Stansted, capable of handling 15 
million passengers a year rising to 25 million; as well as additional work at 
Heathrow, through the construction of a fifth terminal to raise annual 
passenger capacity to 53 million. 
23.28 If these findings are accepted by the government, and a decision is not 
expected until the summer of 1985, then Stansted will be pushed into the 
world's top 20 airports, alongside Heathrow and Gatwick; the planned ceiling 
of 275,000 air transport movements through Heathrow will need to be 
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abolished; and the opportunity to direct investment and employment to 
regions other than the south-east will have been lost. 
23.29 In terms of employment gain and the impact of the development upon 
the local area the GLC has to date supported Stansted's expansion. When 
Terminal 4 opens at Heathrow in 1985 the airport will have reached saturation 
point in terms of the imposed limits on air traffic movements. Terminal 5 would 
require an extension of these limits, which has prompted concern over 
increased noise and air pollution levels as well as raising questions of 
maintaining safety levels with an increased frequency of take-off and landings. 
23 .30 If Terminal 5 is developed the effect on jobs may be relatively small. On 
current plans the new terminal would not be operational until the mid 1990s; it 
would involve the redevelopment of the older terminals in the central complex 
and the transfer of existing flights and airlines to the new facilities. In 
employment terms this would mean few new jobs particularly given the 
long-term opportunities to replace labour by capital investment in new 
technology equipment across many areas of cargo and passenger handling. An 
expanded Stansted on the other hand could play a major part in improving 
employment opportunities in east and north-east London. It would need a 
clear regional land-use plan to ensure these results. 
23.31 Stansted's possible development and the loss of employment at 
Heathrow is a clear example of the need for a single strategic authority across 
the whole of London which is able to work with other local authorities in the 
south-east to ensure a coherent strategic plan that fits in with the region's social 
and economic needs. The GLC, for example, would wish to ensure that 
workers displaced at Heathrow will be offered employment at Stansted. The 
GLC would also aim to control any development of Stansted in order to reduce 
environmental stress upon green belt and residential areas and to ensure that 
industrial, warehouse and office development is in accordance with existing 
planning policy. 
23. 32 The G LC is currently undertaking a review of its position regarding civil 
air transport in London. It will be paying attention to the call, in particular by 
local authorities in the north of England, for a reduction in the present 
north-south imbalance. London's air transport industry can still develop and 
expand but it must not be at the expense of other urban areas of Britain and 
other local authorities who are investing in local airports as a major factor in 
their own strategy to promote industrial and economic regeneration. 
23.33 The government's final decision on Stansted or Heathrow will not be 
based upon wider social concerns. It will reflect the government's determina-
tion to promote BA as a sound investment to potential buyers. Issues centred 
around employment and environment will take second place to British 
Airways' assertion that the sale o{ BA share capital in 1985 would be adversely 
affected by any decision which led to Stansted being developed instead of 
building Terminal 5 at Heathrow. The inspector's report has already indicated 
that the restriction of Heathrow to four terminals would represent a substantial 
under-utilisation of the London area aircraft movement capacity. 
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23 .34 It is one thing for the various parts of a nationalised industry to debate 
and argue over their future structure. It is, however, hardly conducive to an 
objective solution to the future of civil air transport in London and Britain if the 
representatives of two nationalised enterprises, BA and the BAA, argue in such 
a partisan fashion, placing their own post-privatisation interests before the 
future development of the industry in Britain. The reasons why no 
comprehensive plan for London's airports has emerged or been attempted are 
that, ever since 1979, a major concern has been the preparation for privatisation 
by each company. Under the constraints of company law, a private airline will 
be unable to pay attention to the needs of civil air transport as a whole. The 
company has to concentrate on safeguarding the interests of its shareholders 
which may be in conflict with other sectors such as those engaged in running 
London's airports, and which override any notions of a nationalised industry's 
obligation to provide services as a social duty alongside its operations as an 
efficient airline. 
West London: the impact of Heathrow 
23. 35 Heathrow Airport's impact upon the economy of west London extends 
far beyond the civil air transport industries and Heathrow itself. The airport 
exerts a major influence upon employment and training opportunities over a 
wide area, as well as the local mix of manufacturing, warehouse and office uses 
and property and land values. If Heathrow, rather than Stansted, is developed, 
this will increase the pressure for further speculative warehouse and office 
developments, push up land and property values in the area and increase the 
likelihood of major manufacturing firms leaving the area and capitalising upon 
the valuable freehold property assets. 
23.36 Firms in west London such as Hoover, Firestone and United Biscuits 
are three such examples where freehold property and land, in some cases held 
by the firm since the time of the greenfield site development in the 1930s, has 
been sold and has had or awaits redevelopment. The Hoo\'er factory site at 
Perivale, on the market at over £500,000 an acre, and the recent sale of an 
industrial site in Slough for over £1 million an acre indicate the scale of the 
return available from these sites and the pressure for relocation of manufactur-
ing activities . The change in the local mix of skilled and semi-skilled 
employment for both men and women which has resulted from the decline of 
manufacturing and the growth of warehousing is significant and is in part 
directly related to the demands of the airport. 
23 .37 New development and employment in the west London area, much of 
it associated with the airport, have centred upon warehouses, offices and 
hotels at the expense of long-established manufacturing employment. 
23. 38 One of the major processes of industrial change in west London, 
directly related to the needs of the airport and restructuring by manufacturing 
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employers, has been the substttution of warehousing uses for established 
manufacturing employment. The reduction in employment opportunities, 
both in terms of absolute numbers and the mismatch of skills due to this change 
of use is considerable. The switchover from manufacturing to warehouse uses 
in west London has been underpinned by the change in ownership of property 
and land from major manufacturing employers. As part of their restructuring 
programme they continue to capitalise on their assets in the enhanced high 
value property market of the western corridor thereby providing opportunities 
for pension funds and insurance companies to create speculative warehousing 
developments at the expense of the skilled manufacturing workers of the local 
community. 
23 .39 The major developments in west London are typical of this switchover. 
West Cross Centre on the Great West Road is a development of offices, 
headquarters buildings and industrial and warehouse units developed by 
Royal Insurance and Builders Amalgamated. Built on the site of the Firestone 
tyre factory, which employed over 2,000 people, to date the tenants of West 
Cross are office and warehouse users with little or no manufacturing. Even 
more significant has been the development of the Great Western Industrial 
Park by the Sun Life Assurance Society on the site of the AEC Leyland plant in 
Windmill Lane, Hot.ifisloW. Three thousand workers lost their jobs when the 
plant was closed as part of Leyland's restructuring programme. Phase I of the 
park has again attracted little manufacturing and appealed largely to firms 
engaged in transport, warehousing and distribution. 
23 .40 One of the most dominant trends in this sector has been the growth of 
contract warehousing whereby firms rent out space or operate an entire 
distribution system for their customers. Contract warehousing needs to be 
located in areas with a large number of manufacturing firms, close to 
import/export points, such as sea and airports, and with good communications 
such as rapid access to motorways. By its nature contract warehousing is, 
therefore, speculative development which relies heavily upon the initial 
locational decision for its subsequent success. West London's manufacturing 
tradition, Heathrow Airport and the access to the Ml, M25, M3, M4 and M40 
fulfill all the criteria for the location of contract warehousing and this draw 
towards west London is reflected in the warehousing floorspace statistics, seen 
in Table 1. 
23 .41 The demand for warehousing generated by the airport allows the 
developers to look beyond the two to three year development period and 
foresee demand for warehousing space being maintained in this area for years 
to come. The result has been the development of user-ready warehousing units 
in preference to manufacturing space . 
23.42 The problems of forecasting the type of demand in west London are, 
therefore, less difficult perhaps than elsewhere in L'ondon due to the 
overwhelming influence of the airport. The scale of the demand has, however, 
been grossly overestimated. The opening of Terminal 4 will not lead to an 
increase in cargo handling in line with the increase of warehousing floorspace. 
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Table 1: Top Ten London Boroughs in terms of Warehouse Floorspace-1974-81 
1974 1981 000m2 ~ ~ Change 
Southwark Southwark 1,394.9 +4.2 
Tower Hamlets EALING 1,162.4 +34.1 
Islington Tower Hamlets 1,096.1 +2.0 
EALING Camden 988.0 +19.6 
Camden Islington 905.2 -0.7 
Westminster HOUNSLOW 904.3 +34.6 
HOUNSLOW Greenwich 691.1 +37.2 
Hackney Westminster 599.0 -10.9 
Lambeth BRENT 594.2 +28.5 
Greenwich HILLING DON 594.2 +19.8 
The failure to estimate the scale of demand at this time has been substantial and 
an excessive over supply has resulted. Hounslow in particular has suffered 
from these processes. Between 1978 and 1983 premises rated as factories fell by 
10 per cent whilst the stock of warehouses increased by 14 per cent. 
23.43 Across the whole of the outer north west area of Greater London this 
growth of often speculative warehousing led to over 5,200,000 sq.ft of vacant 
warehousing space in 1980, much of it in place of skilled manufacturing 
employment. The inspector's report on the increase in off-airport employment 
attributable solely to Terminal 4 concluded that airport user services were only 
anticipated to produce some 1,400 jobs plus secondary employment services 
adding a further 2,500 to 3,150. So that even in simple numerical terms the 
impact of the continued growth of Heathrow upon employment opportunities 
in west London is not necessarily beneficial. Moreover it represents a complex 
change in the demand for skills in the local economy. 
23 .44 The pressure for office development in west London in the last five to 
ten years has been substantial and is reflected in the office rental levels 
throughout London and the surrounding areas. The basic pattern of office 
rents in the south-east region has generally been that they fall with distance 
from London. However in west London a different pattern has emerged with 
an area of high rents running west from the City along the line of the M4 
including Hammersmith, Hounslow, Heathrow, Slough, Maidenhead and 
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Reading. The concentration of office development in outer west London in 
particular is also evident from the completion statistics. For example the inner 
north, east and south sectors of Greater London together accounted for 560,000 
sq.ft. gross of office floorspace between 1981 and 1983, a figure exceeded by the 
Borough of Hounslow alone with 650,000 sq.ft. Excluding the central London 
area the most active London borough in terms of current developments is 
Croydon. However, the next three highest totals are recorded by Ealing, 
Hillingdon and Hounslow, all surrounding Heathrow Airport. 
23.45 West London offers an office location close to central London, with 
good access to the national motorway network, at the beginning of the 
'Western Corridor' and in close proximity to the world's busiest international 
airport. Heathrow, therefore, does not only generate a demand for ware-
houses, it still provide many jobs, it attracts new high-technology industrial 
development as well as office and hotel development to serve the business 
community which passes through Heathrow. In west London, however, many 
of these pressures have worked against continuing job opportunities in 
manufacturing industries. The expansion of Stansted would divert part of the 
future pressure on land and property in west London. Urgent action is required 
to limit the further encroachment of warehousing, office and hotel investments 
into the industrial economy of west London. 
23.46 By 1983 the draft alterations to the GLDP noted that development 
trends in the 1970s and early 1980s have exposed major weaknesses in strategic 
policies. One consequence of these weaknesses has been the disparity in 
development pressures between west London on the one hand and most of the 
eastern and inner areas on the other. In these areas, and in place of the 
open-ended 'preferred office location' designations of the existing GLDP, 
policies are now to be more responsive to the actual development situations in 
different parts of London. The aim is a more equitable and balanced 
distribution of development both within and between sectors of London. 
The GLC and civil air transport in London 
23.47 The GLC's principal powers in relation to the development of 
Heathrow are those of a strategic planning authority. The Council's policy has 
been set out in the revised GLDP. 
23 . 48 The Council has no direct economic control over the operation of civil 
air transport in London since, unlike other metropolitan airports like 
Birmingham and Manchester, Heathrow is not under municipal control. 
23.49 The GLC's contribution to the future of employment in Heathrow and 
west London has been along four lines: 
(a) The Council has supported the trade union campaign against the 
privatisation of British Airways and the British Airports Authority. 
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(b) By direct intervention through its early warning system and through 
GLEB the Council has tried to slow down the destruction of the main 
industrial plants in west London as a result of rising property prices. Its 
takeover of Magnatex, the car components firm in Hounslow, has been 
the largest intervention to date. GLEB has also invested in Standard 
Bookbinding in Park Royal not only to secure jobs in a firm within a 
hard-hit sector but also to maintain an essential element of the 
publishing process within London. Other schemes with parallel 
employment effects are under consideration in Ealing and Brent. 
The most recent initiative is GLEB's purchase of 21 acres of industrial 
land at Hounslow Heath, three miles from Heathrow and a prime site 
for the office/retailing/hotel/warehousing types of development spelt 
out above. GLEB intends to develop Hounslow Heath against the tide 
as an industrial estate giving priority to electronic and engineering 
industries. 
(c) The GLC has made a contribution through its research resources. The 
publication of the West London Report has served to draw together many 
issues which people and groups working in the area have identified as 
underlying the local industrial change which has led to so many job 
losses in west London. This report not only considered the importance 
of Heathrow and the aerospace industry to the local economy but also 
the widespread problems associated with its continued growth. The 
Council has also produced a report through an independent researcher 
which assesses the impact of privatisation upon the London economy 
within the context of the position adopted by British Airways, the Civil 
Aviation Authority and the BAA who run Heathrow. Research is being 
carried out to determine the extent of sub-contracting within the 
airport perimeter, the extent of job loss associated with this change, as 
well as the worsening wage levels and conditions of work already 
reported by workers previously directly employed within Heathrow. 
In particular, the GLC will seek to monitor further change and thereby 
highlight the differential impact of privatisation upon Asian and other 
black women and men workers. 
(d) With the closure of British Airways apprenticeship school and the 
development of industrial sites such as Hounslow Heath the GLC, 
through the Greater London Training Board, aims to ensure that 
appropriate training schemes are available to people in west London. 
This takes account of the substantial job loss from Heathrow and the 
opportunities for skilled employment within local airport-related 
industries. Particular attention is to be given to the needs of women 
and ethnic minority groups in determining these training programmes 
for the local community. 
The GLC is also putting back into west London the training 
opportunities which have been lost from the area. Recruitment of first 
year craft and technician apprentices in engineering in the area had 
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been cut in 1983 to only 36% of the 1979 level. Closure of government 
skillcentre sites in the area has added to the decline. The GLTB has 
funded groups such as the Hounslow Engineering Group Training 
Association in an attempt to reverse this deskilling of an area and a 
generation of young people. 
Also through the funding of Co-operative Development Agencies 
(CDAs) in Ealing and Brent and through the GLC's Outer West 
London Area office the Council is actively suporting local businesses, 
co-ops and groups such as Hillingdon Asian Women's Group which 
offer training and employment opportunities and support and advice 
to local people. They emphasise particularly the needs of women and 
ethnic minority groups in the local community. 
Conclusion 
23.50 Civil air transport industries can, if they are properly organised and 
planned, make a contribution to the industrial strategies of local authorities. 
The level of capital investment given by authorities such as the West Midlands 
Council, for example, to the development of Birmingham Airport, shows that 
civil air transport within a metropolitan area can be used as a focus for 
industrial regeneration. But, for this to be possible, its effects on the 
surrounding economy, local people and their prospects for employment must 
be considered with more seriousness than can occur under current proposals 
for privatisation. 
23.51 The GLC must continue to join with other like-minded groups to 
campaign for the retention of British Airways and the British Airports 
Authority within the public sector. In the longer term, in stressing the 
importance of the civil air transport industries remaining as nationalised 
concerns, the GLC in association with other bodies and local authorities such as 
the West Midlands, Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire Councils should 
call for the development of a comprehensive and coherent strategy for civil air 
transport and aerospace industries within Britain. 
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Proposals for action 
1. The GLC will undertake a review of civil air transport in London, to 
assess its current position which is to favour the expansion of Stansted over 
the development of a fifth terminal at Heathrow and to assess the potential for 
working with other like-minded authorities to redress the regional imbalance 
which currently exists within civil aviation in Britain. 
2. The GLC will join with other like-minded groups to campaign for the 
retention of both British Airways and the British Airports Authority within 
the public sector. 
3. The GLC will continue to campaign with other local authorities, trades 
unionists and other groups within the civil air transport industries to pressure 
centrai government to deveiop a comprehensive and coherent strategy for 
civil air transport and aerospace industries within Britain which acknow-
ledges the importance of London and the rest of the south east within that 
strategy. It would recognise the needs of the local resident and working 
population within the national context of the growth and development of the 
industry. 
4. The GLC will work with other local authorities, trades unions and local 
community groups to prevent the further privatisation and sub-contracting of 
employment provided within the perimeter of London's airports, particularly 
Heathrow, to develop research and monitoring initiatives to highlight further job loss and worsening of conditions particularly for black women and men. 
5. By making use of the research resources within the GLC and within the 
experience of existing groupings in west London, the GLC will establish a 
statistical and analytical base across a wide range of topics related to civil air 
transport which may be drawn upon by all those working to sustain 
employment in these and related industries. 
6. Together with GLEB the GLC will determine the extent of local industry 
associated with Heathrow Airport, the level of skills present within the local 
area in these linked industries, and the potential for intervention and 
investment by GLEB either in new ventures or existing firms. 
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7. With the closure of British Airways apprenticeship school the GLC, 
through the Greater London Training Board, will ensure that appropriate 
training schemes are available to people in west London taking account of the 
substantial job loss from Heathrow and the opportunities for skilled 
employment within local airport-related industries. Particular attention must 
be given to the needs of women and ethnic minority groups in determining 
these training programmes for the local community. 
8. The GLC will reaffirm its committment to oppose racism within the 
workplace, to encourage and develop in a positive manner discussion 
between employers, trades unionists and representatives of the local Asian, 
Afro-Caribbean and other ethnic minority groups working within civil air 
transport and related industries within London. 
9. The GLC, as the strategic planning authority, will wherever possible act 
to control and direct development in west London associated with Heathrow 
Airport. 
Source: 
GLC, The West London Report, 1984 
GLC, The Future of London: Draft Alterations to the Greater London Development Plan, 1983 
Peter Richards, Capital for Civil Air Transport, GLC 1984 
British Airways Joint Shop Stewards Committee, Civil Air Transport: Its Future and Development, 
1983 
Department of Transport, Inspectors' Report of the Stansted Airport Inquiry, 1984 

S ction Six: 
LONDON'S 
ECONOMIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
24. 
The docks 
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Ships at the bottom of the garden, laid up in the Royal Docks. The 
GLC is committed to plans for local industrial and community use of 
the Royals, devised by the people who live there. 
Photo: Dock]ands Community Poster Project. 
[Image removed at request of London Metropolitan Archive as a condition of digital distribution.]
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The docks 
Summary 
1. Docklands was the core of east London's local economy. For every job in 
the docks there were some three jobs in dock-related industries. Now much of 
that is in danger of being lost, and some of it already has been. The upstream 
docks, the West and East India docks in the Isle of Dogs and the Royal docks 
in Newham, are closed. Speculative land development has accelerated as the 
London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) has taken over control 
of the area. 
2. Over-capacity in British ports has caused port authorities, including the 
Port of London Authority, to attempt to cut labour costs. The new technology 
of containerisation drastically reduced the need for dock workers. It also 
meant that ship-owners could transfer to new ports, for example Felixstowe; 
the containers could then be carried by lorry to their destination, thus 
imposing extra public costs on the roads. The ability of the old ports to shed 
labour was restricted by the gains won by dockers under the National Dock 
Labour Scheme (NDLS). Moreover the upstream docks in London were 
unsuitable for the large container vessels used for long sea routes. The PLA's 
strategy was to try to attract these downstream to Tilbury, and to abandon the 
upstream docks. It made little attempt to attract the growing European trade. 
3. From the 19th century onwards, dockers fought against casualisation, 
unemployment and poverty. Then, from the early 1970s they fought to protect 
their jobs and the gains made under the NDLS, which from 1967 provided 
some security of employment for dock workers and trade union involvement 
in recruitment policies and conditions of work. The dockers also put forward 
plans for alternative uses of the docks. 
4. The decline of the Port of London has not been inevitable. There is 
potential for reversal. The PLA could have provided specialised facilities for 
certain types of trade. Some of the upstream wharves on the river are still 
used. Public policies could have ensured that the charges at other ports 
reflected the public costs of extra use of the roads; they could have relieved the 
PLA of some of the historic costs of a fixed labour force. 
5. In the GLC's evidence at the STOLport enquiry, proposals were made for 
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the retention of the upstream wharves and docks for certain uses. Use of the 
Royal Docks is incompatible with the STOL port proposal, and the latter bears 
no relation to the needs of the existing population of docklands. In particular 
it is in complete conflict with the plans put forward by local people with the 
support of the GLC: the People's Plan for the Royal Docks. 
6. The GLC is committed to proposals for local uses of the Royal Docks area 
and for local and dock-related industries put forward in the People's Plan and 
also developed by the GLC and GLEB. It is committed to the full use of the 
river. Finally, it is committed to the retention of facilities in the docks as part 
of an integrated plan for transport in London, including road haulage and rail. 
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24.01 Much of the life of the East End of London has revolved around the 
docks and the powerful traditions of dock work. The docks were at the heart of 
east London's economy. Its industries and transport network were dependent 
on them. It has been estimated that for every job in the docks there were three 
dependent jobs in dock-related manufacturing, transport and service indus-
tries. These ranged from ship repair to industries which were first set up to 
process the products imported from the colonies; they included food 
processing, road haulage, shipping agencies and many others. 
24.02 Much of this industrial activity has already been lost. In 1971, some 
13,500 people were employed in the docks and wharves in the five docklands 
boroughs (Greenwich, Lewisham, Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets). 
Some 3,500 were employed in the directly related activity of ship repair. The 
road haulage industry employed about 8,500 people. The dockers worked in 
the major enclosed docks in the upstream port: the West India docks in the Isle 
of Dogs, and the group of three enclosed docks known as the Royals - the 
Royal Victoria Dock, the Royal Albert Dock, and the King George V Dock- in 
the area between Silvertown and North Woolwich to the south and Beckton to 
the north. 
24.03 But in 1980 the West India Dock was closed. By 1981 only about 3,500 
people were employed in the upstream port, and in that year the last remaining 
upstream docks, at the Royals, were closed for cargo handling with the loss of 
most of the remaining dockers' jobs. At the beginning of 1985, there were about 
325 registered dockers upstream, all of them employed on wharves between 
Woolwich and the Isle of Dogs. By 1981 less than 400 jobs remained in the five 
Docklands boroughs in ship repair, and about 4,000 jobs in road haulage; since 
then, many more have gone. 
24.04 Some of the dockers made redundant were transferred to the 
downstream port at Tilbury; some of these subsequently gave up their jobs at 
Tilbury because the travelling time was too great and at Tilbury itself several 
thousand jobs have gone. Some of the dock jobs had already been lost as 
dockers retired and were not replaced; others took redundancy and severance 
pay. The decline of the docks and related industry, coupled with the recession, 
has led to high levels of unemployment. In the five docklands boroughs there 
are now about 80,000 people unemployed. 
24.05 The Port of London is no longer predominant in south east England. 
The so-called 'container revolution', the system of carrying goods in large 
boxes rather than unloading them individually at docks, has not only 
drastically reduuced the amount of labour needed in the docks. It has also 
given ship-owners the flexibility to shift to ports where the charges are lowest; 
charges at Felixstowe, for example, are much lower than the charges in the Port 
of London. It has enabled port employers to break with established patterns of 
labour and trade union control which had been built up through industrial 
struggle over the previous century. It has also meant that goods which 
previously travelled by water now travel by lorry, thus imposing heavy 
burdens on the road system-and leaving the river far emptier than it need be. 
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24.06 The loss of dock work in London led to reduced activity and job losses in 
port-related activities; and the reduction in port-related manufacturing and 
transport activities in turn reinforced the relative disadvantages of the Port of 
London. Ship-owners were inevitably less attracted to a port which had 
declining local markets and deteriorating back-up facilities, such as ship repair. 
The combination of locational factors which had previously reinforced the 
relative advantages of London as a port were reversed. They were replaced by a 
spiral of decline. 
24.07 The decline of the docks and wharves released large amounts of land, 
often in prestige riverside locations close to the centre of London, for 
speculation in offices, luxury warehouse conversions and leisure develop-
Table 1: Data on changing employment of goods vehicle drivers in Greater London 
1971-81 
Total Total 
Drivers Drivers 
Industry 1971 1981 
Vehicle Manufacturing Engineering 3,510 3,698 
Other Heavy Industries 2,990 3,193 
Food, Drink, Tobacco 5,560 3,338 
Paper, Print 3,000 1,796 
Other Manufacturing 3,030 2,459 
Wholesale Distribution 11,820 9,473 
Retail Distribution 4,580 2,415 
Construction 4,690 1,885 
Transport, Communications 26,460 14,439 
Public Administration, Defence 4,200 2,704 
Other Services 6,440 6,919 
76,280 52,319 
Source: 1971 Census (10% sample data), 1981 Labour Force Survey (one half% sample) 
Note: The 1981 figures are considerably less reliable than the 1971 figures, and not entirely comparable. The 
impression of employment decline given is likely to be correct. The total for 1971 is slightly below the total for 
this category of employment in the full census, since industries with small numbers of drivers are omitted. The 
same type of undercounting will have occured in the 1981 data. 
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ments. Wharf owners, like the proprietors of Hays Wharf and the Port of 
London Authority itself, have increasingly moved into property speculation. 
The St Katharines Dock office, hotel and marina complex was the first stage in 
this transformation, followed by the plans for a giant office scheme on Hays 
Wharf. 
24 .08 The setting up of the London Docklands Development Corporation 
(LDDC) in 1981 is the most recent stage in the move from dock industry and 
local housing to up-market property development. The LDDC has promoted 
the Isle of Dogs Enterprise Zone, an airport in the Royal Docks, and two Earth 
Satellite 'Teleports', none of which caters for the needs of local people or are 
likely to create more than a few local jobs. 
24.09 As the docks have moved downstream with one dock closure following 
another from 1967 to 1981, the PLA has argued that the redevelopment of 
upstream docks like St Katharines and the Surrey Docks would enable the PLA 
to consolidate at docks further downstream like the West India or the Royals. 
But this consolidation never happened. Very little investment was made in the 
upper docks and now even Tilbury' s future is uncertain. The decline of the 
docks and the increasing pressures for speculative development were not 
inevitable. It was partly planned by the PLA, some of the borough councils and 
successive governments. But, as we shall argue, through the combined action 
of local organisations and trades unions in conjunction with borough councils 
and the GLC, this process can be halted . 
Shifting patterns of trade 
24 .10 In London, operations on the river are regulated by a public 
corporation, the Port of London Authority (PLA). The PLA was set up in 1908 
in response to a spate of bankruptcies and extreme competition in the private 
docks sector, and in order to promote systematic investment and develop a 
united employers' front in the face of an increasingly organised workforce . The 
PLA has blamed some of its problems on the dockers' resistance to the 
introduction of new technologies. But in fact much wider issues are involved in 
the loss of trade in London. 
24 .11 Although London's port was of economic significance.in pre-industrial 
times, its great expansion in the nineteenth century was based on trade with 
the Empire, as the names of the West India and East India Docks illustrate. The 
docks were used for the import of raw materials and food from the colonies and 
for the export of manufactured goods, often based on these materials. 
Alongside the docks system which developed in the East End of London from 
the middle of the 19th century onwards, associated food refining and other 
processing industries grew up . They included Tate and Lyle in sugar refining 
and the production of animal feeds and edible oils. Ship repairers such as 
Harland and Woolf, shipping agencies and other shipping services were 
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established in the vicinity. The complex of smaHer wharves on the river itself 
serviced specific wharfside industries, such as the Lenantons timber mills on 
the Isle of Dogs. Together with the docks themselves they were a key element 
in a linked transport network, first rail and then road haulage, to the London 
market and beyond, as well as in the provision of raw materials for local 
manufacturing industries. 
24.12 In the 1960s, shipping companies, like employers in other sectors, faced 
declining profits and increased competition, and in the 1970s their problems 
were compounded by the sluggish growth in world trade. They responded, in 
part, by introducing containerisation. Containerisation has meant that goods, 
rather than being carried 'loose' in ships, are packed at or near their point of 
origin; the containers can then be loaded onto road, rail and ships and off again, 
without being unpacked until they reach their final destination. Containerisa-
tion saves both time and labour; it reduces the turnaround time of ships 
dramatically, while simultaneously decreasing the dependence on highly 
organised dock labour. 
24.13 From the point of view of London, containerisation had the additional 
effect of increasing competition · between ports and gave the shipping 
companies greater flexibility. Goods do not need to be shipped so close to their 
market; they can be carried by road or rail to their point of production or 
distribution. Increased competition between ports, reinforced by the failure of 
public policies to tackle the long-term problems of over-capacity in British 
ports, in turn pushed port charges lower and gave more opportunities for 
avoiding registered dock labour. The Port of London lost out on both counts. 
24.14 London suffered the further disadvantage that the upstream docks 
were unsuited to the larger deep sea container vessels, which require 12 metres 
of water rather than the more conventional three metres. They also require 
specialist facilities and large amounts of back-up land, rather than the transit 
sheds which the upstream docks have and which are suitable for traditional 
Table 2: Operating revenue of PLA by source: 
1976 (%) 1981 (%) 
Total operating revenue of which: 67,066 84,473 
Cargo handling 39,232 (59) 45,763 (54) 
Dock and conservancy charges 9,352 (14) 12,368 (15) 
Port rates on goods 8,499 (13) 11,763 (14) 
Source: PLA Annual Report and Accounts 
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general cargoes. But London's biggest disadvantage in relation to the newer 
coastal ports is that the PLA's accounts carry the historic costs of employing a 
relatively fixed labour force under the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) 
the need for which declined dramatically as a result of containerisation. On the 
other hand, it was in theory expected to balance its books, although it has in fact 
failed to do so since 1978. Nor has it benefitted from large public investment, as 
some ports abroad have done. It therefore attempted to pass its costs on to the 
shipping companies in increased port charges, which in turn further reduced 
its trade and increased the cost of carrying 'surplus' labour. 
24 .15 The smaller non-scheme (i.e ., non-NDLS) ports such as Dover and 
Felixstowe started without large numbers of dockers and without the cost 
burdens of severance pay. They did not have established labour practices; 
employers could therefore achieve manning agreements more attractive to 
themselves. Thus, although these ports have been unionised, and the 
employers certainly cannot easily impose wage cuts, the jobs lost in London 
have nevertheless been replaced, in part, by jobs elsewhere which are on more 
favourable terms for the employers. This process may be taken further with the 
government's Free Port experiments; in Southampton there were fears that the 
Free Port would be used as a means of avoiding dock labour and using cheaper, 
less organised labour to perform tasks that were essentially dockers' work. 
A history of conflict 
24.16 The collective efforts to achieve effective trade union organisation, 
better pay and regular employment in the docks run through the labour history 
of east London, from the dock strike of 1889 through to the industrial actions in 
1984. In the 19th century the docks and associated industries were based on the 
widespread use of casual labour. Workers were needed when ships arrived or 
products were in season. The rest of the time there was little or no work for 
them. As the docks expanded, the numbers of seasonally unemployed grew 
and high unemployment became a constant pressure . Poverty was wide-
spread. Up until the Second World War, dock labour continued to be organised 
on a casual basis. Dockers queued up at the dock gates to fight for work. 
24.17 After the war, in 1947, wartime measures were formalised in the 
National Dock Labour Scheme, which ended the worst abuses of the casual 
labour system. Each port had its Dock Labour Board, jointly controlled by the 
dock employers and the trade unions, which employed dockers from a 
registered list. Dockers who were not working were paid a guaranteed 
minimum wage. Those who were required by the employers, on any particular 
shift, were hired out to the actual dock employer. 
24.18 Recruitment, dismissal, discipline, welfare and training were all 
covered by the Dock Labour Boards (with trade union involvement). On the 
other hand, the father-to-son tradition of recruitment was not effectively 
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altered; a factor of considerable importance in terms of equal opportunities 
subsequently,. because such traditional recruitment systems naturally operate 
to the disadvantage of newcomers, including those from ethnic minorities. 
24.19 The employers argued that the Dock Labour Scheme fostered restrictive 
practices, including resistance to new technologies, such as the strike over the 
introduction of fork lift trucks in 1958. They continued to contest the 
improvements for the workforce contained in the scheme; and the scheme 
undoubtedly fuelled their interest in introducing further new technologies, 
including containerisation, which would lessen their dependence on organised 
dock labour. 
24.20 The Devlin Committee was set up in 1965 to tackle the problems posed 
by the introduction of new technologies in the Port Transport Industry. The 
Committee's report was essentially a compromise, which satisfied neither 
labour nor the employers. Following Devlin, all registered dockers were 
employed on a permanent basis and paid a wage, whether they were employed 
or not, which led to a 4% increase in the employers' wages bills. 
Decasualisation had the effect of adding costs disproportionately to the older 
ports such as London, and exacerbated some of their subsequent difficulties in 
remaining competitive. 
24.21 The dockers, on the other hand, made concessions about manning and 
other working practices, ~nd they still faced the ultimate challenge posed by 
employers through the introduction of new container technologies. National-
ly, there were 130,000 registered dockers in 1966. In ten years alone, the 
number dropped to 76,000. There was a concerted attack by governments on 
the power of the dockers unions during the 1970s, in ways similar to the current 
attacks on the National Union of Mineworkers. 
24.22 From the early 1970~ onwards, the dockers fought defensive battles to 
retain their jobs and conditions, and in particular against the threats posed by 
containerisation. In London the 1972 Chobham Farm dispute centred on the 
employers' attempt to have the ' stuffing and stripping' of containers done by 
less organised labour outside the port of London. It led to the imprisonment of 
the Pentonville five and their release after the threat of a general strike . In 1976 
there was a major campaign to resist the closure of the West India docks. In 
1984 a further round of disputes took place in defence of the NDLS. 
24.23 During their campaign against closures, the dockers put forward plans 
for alternative uses of the docks, plans which were later taken up by the GLC 
and backed with further evidence . These plans were worked out together with 
the local community and they involved proposals for more specialised uses of 
the docks. They did in fact succeed in delaying the closure of the Royal docks. 
But they were not able to prevent the loss of dockers' jobs, and the eventual 
closure of the upstream docks in London, for the time being at any rate. The 
plans foundered on the opposition of the PLA, which itself was subject to 
pressures both from the government and via the LDDC. 
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The strategies of the Port of London Authority 
24.24 The PLA has, broadly speaking, accepted the loss of trade in the 
upstream docks as inevitable. It has typically claimed that it is merely 
responding to the inexorable forces of technological change. It has argued that 
the future lies with containerisation and thatthe upstream docks are unsuitable 
for deep-sea container routes. Alternative strategies, such as attempting to 
attract the smaller short sea-route container vessels dealing with the growing 
EEC and Mediterranean trade, never effectively emerged on the agenda of 
Table 3: Port Traffic by Major Ports 1965-1981 
(excluding fuel) 
1965 1970 
000 000 
PORT tonnes % tonnes % 
G.B. TOTAL 101,917 100 111,266 100 
London 19,946 19.6 18,726 16.8 
Medway 1,325 1.3 2,078 1.9 
Dover 810 0.8 1,651 1.5 
Shoreham 545 0.5 735 0.7 
Southampton 1,283 1.3 1,813 1.6 
Felixstowe * * 1,954 1.8 
Ipswich 721 0.7 978 0.9 
Harwich 575 0.6 2,108 1.9 
Great 
Yarmouth 451 0.4 544 0.5 
Plymouth 598 0.6 630 0.6 
Bristol 3,745 3.7 3,304 3.0 
Liverpool 15,270 ~5.0 13,622 12.2 
Hull 4,548 4.5 4,745 4.3 
• not available 
Source: National Ports Council 
1975 1978 1981 
000 000 000 
tonnes % tonnes % tonnes % 
110,063 100 125,562 100 120,575 100 
14,766 13.4 17,536 ~4.0 14,431 12.0 
1,858 1.7 2,393 1.9 2,588 2.1 
3,315 3.0 5,142 4.1 6,538 5.4 
521 0.5 985 0.8 1,171 1.0 
2,977 2.7 3,655 2.9 2,041 1.7 
3,836 3.5 4,444 3.5 5,960 4.9 
1,265 1.1 1,725 1.4 1,981 1.6 
2,075 1.9 3,074 2.4 2,936 2.4 
868 0.8 1,091 0.9 1,252 1.0 
646 0.6 868 0.7 776 0.6 
2,803 2.5 2,972 2.4 2,606 2.2 
10,030 9.1 10,082 8.0 7,158 5.9 
3,799 3.5 3,385 2.7 3,630 3.0 
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public policy. Yet, as it turned out, the shift to larger container vessels was a 
limited one, and long-distance trade was declining relative to the new trade 
with Europe. The PLA made little effective attempt to compete with the 
expanding coastal ports for this trade. 
24.25 Instead, it more or less confined its activities to the attempt to attract 
deep sea traffic to the downstream port at Tilbury. Its strategy was to close the 
upstream docks and concentrate downstream at Tilbury, and potentially in a 
megaport at Maplin, which however was a dream that was never realised. It 
planned to finance this strategy, and the costs of laying off the upstream 
dockworkers, by selling its assets upstream. 
24.26 The result has been that the coastal ports have picked up on the short 
sea routes, with rapid turnaround times, while the deep sea traffic has gone 
elsewhere, particularly to Rotterdam. Between 1970 and 1975 London's share 
of UK imports fell from 25% to 14% and its share of exports from 19% to 11 % . 
Between 1978 and 1981 London stood out as the only port in the south east to 
have lost market share; all other south east ports (except Harwich) actually 
increased their tonnage. Dover has grown by 95% since 1965 and is now 
Britain's third largest non-fuel port. Between 1978 and 1981 Dover achieved a 
27% growth and Felixstowe grew by 34% largely because they were attracting 
unitised, or containerised cargoes, mainly from the EEC, although Felixstowe 
also caters for deep sea trade. 
24.27 Meanwhile London's trade fell by a further 18%. London was failing to 
attract the growing unitised trade either as a deep sea port at Tilbury or for the 
short sea routes. In addition, London was failing to develop specialised 
facilities, which was also a feature of the newer cargo patterns (since cargoes 
are becoming increasingly specialised commodity by commodity, rather than 
mixed in traditional general cargoes). Although the PLA did try to develop both 
roll-on/roll-off facilities (for freight lorries driving on and off ferries) for short 
sea traffic and specialist timber and grain cargoes, for instance to Tilbury, they 
failed to do so on a large enough scale to offset the overall pattern of decline. 
Much of this decline can be put at the door of the failures of the PLA's 
management. 
What are the alternatives? 
24.28 Even if the PLA had been under different management it would still 
have had to cope with fierce competition, nationally and internationally, from 
an unequal position. But the PLA has missed out on major opportunities for 
developing a more positive strategy for the Port of London as a whole, and for 
the upstream port in particular. Such alternative strategies could have had 
major benefits for the Port and for port-related industries and employment, as 
well as being consistent with a more rational and environmentally sensitive 
strategy for all forms of transport in east London and beyond. 
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24.29 In outline, an alternative and more positive strategy rests on the view 
that within the framework of the disadvantages of London there are also 
significant exceptions and counter tendencies. The provision of specialised 
investments to attract these specific trades could have led to the maintenance 
and modernisation of a smaller, more specialised but thereby still viable Port of 
London, upstream. The PLA' s failure to invest in the upstream port has meant 
that some of these opportunities have been irretrievably lost. But some, 
nevertheless, remain and could be built upon, as part of a wider strategy for 
transport, distribution and industry in east London. Such a strategy must not 
only make sense as part of a national plan for transport, but it must take account 
of the needs of the community in a particularly deprived part of London. It is 
for these reasons that the GLC believes it should take over planning 
responsibility for the upstream port and the river from the PLA and the Thames 
Water Authority, and that the LDDC should be abolished and its powers 
returned to the GLC and the boroughs. 
24.30 One of the GLC's earliest and most important interventions on the 
question of the docks was over the STOL airport plan. The STOLport, a Short 
Take Off and Landing Airport for business travellers, was proposed in 1982 by 
John Mowlems, the construction company, backed by De Havilland of Canada, 
manufacturers of STOL aircraft. The project was strongly supported by the 
PLA who saw it as a chance to make a windfall profit from their landholdings. 
There were suspicions that the PLA closed the Royal Docks in 1981 because 
they had already begun discussions with Mowlems about an airport. 
24.31 The LDDC seized upon the STOLport as an image builder, 'an exciting 
new concept in travel', that would transform the investment climate in 
docklands and act as a 'catalyst' for development elsewhere in the Royals. The 
LDDCdaimed that the airport would create up to 5,000 jobs both in the airport 
itself and by the attraction of high technology firms to the area. These claims 
were challenged by Newham Council, the GLC and by local groups. There 
were some residents, however, who supported the STOLport because they 
saw no alternative available that could end the dereliction around them. 
24.32 The main task of the GLC and local groups at the STOLport Public 
Inquiry that took place in 1983 was, therefore, to examine critically the job 
claims of the promoters and to show in detail that there were alternative ways 
of using the docks area, including keeping part of the docks open, and creating 
jobs in keeping with local needs. 
24.33 The airport itself meets virtually none of these needs. Local people 
would of course, not use the airport themselves; it is intended to cut the 
travelling time to Europe of businessmen from the nearby City of London and 
there is moreover no intention to provide freight handling or even much 
baggage handling; the businessmen are expected to move rapidly in and out 
with their briefcases. 
24.34 The number of jobs provided for local residents would be minimal. 
Mowlem estimated that with the airport operating at maximum capacity, the 
622 London Industrial Strategy - The Docks 
number of jobs would range from 359-464, of which just 94 would be in running 
the airport itself. About one-third of the total jobs would be specialist tasks like 
air traffic controllers and pilots; many others would transfer in with the airlines, 
and therefore would not provide jobs for those in the East End job market. 
24.35 But it was the so called 'induced' employment claim that caused the 
greatest controversy at the Inquiry. Both Mowlems and the LDDC announced 
that the airport would attract over 4,000 jobs into the area in offices and high 
technology firms. These estimates were revised downwards during the Inquiry 
and the Inquiry Inspector concluded: 'I share the reservations expressed by 
objectors about the amount of induced employment that some people expect to 
be attracted to the area because of the presence of the STOL port. There is little 
hard evidence to support the opinion that the STOL port by itself would act as a 
major catalyst in the regeneration of the Royal Docks, and the induced 
employment forecasts have a particularly speculative ring about them'. 
24.36 In fact both the GLC and local groups showed that the airport would 
lead to the displacement of jobs from the docks. There were over 50 firms 
employing 700 people within the dock walls and of these jobs it was estimated 
100 would be directly affected by the airport, with a further 300 affected by 
potential expansion of the airport. 
24.37 As far as noise and pollution go, the proposals have been justified on 
the grounds that the De Havilland aircraft (Dash-6 and D2.sh 7) which are said 
to be going to use the STOLport are exceptionally quiet. But it has already 
become clear that the airport would not be profitable if it was used exclusively 
by Dash aircraft. The probability is that once the STOL port was in existence and 
found to be unprofitable, arguments would be found to justify its use for 
helicopters and noisier aircraft. 
24.38 Worst of all, the STOLport would be incompatible with many other 
activities such as housing and recreation which could be of more benefit to local 
people; as well as making the Royal Docks unusable for cargo-handling. The 
GLC's evidence at the STOLport enquiry concentrated on the need to develop a 
small port facility and to build on the area's potential as a freight, transport and 
distribution centre for the London market. The GLC's evidence was based 
partly on a study which it commissioned from a private firmof consultants, 
Roger Tym and Partners. This study reached conclusions which were similar to 
the alternative plans already put forward by dockers' organisations during 
their campaign against closures. 
24.39 The consultants explored the question of which, if any, types of goods 
and services could be retained in or attracted to the London port, and they 
developed a plan to examine the relative costs. They concluded that the Royal 
Docks still enjoyed cost advantages for certain trades or routes specifically 
geared to the London market, for example for small bulk carriers (10,000 dwt), 
and that the Royals could compete for container traffic on near and short sea 
routes; these are currently dominated by Felixstowe, Harwich and Ipswich, 
which account for 46% of the south east's near and short sea routes. 
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Table 4: Origin and destination of trade - London and the South East 1978 
000' s tonnes 
Greater London Other South East 
Commodity 
Group 
Foodstuffs 
Basic 
Materials 
anufactured M 
G oods 
All 
Goods 
Route Imports 
Near Sea 854 
Short Sea 691 
Deep Sea 1,440 
Near Sea 240 
Short Sea 350 
Deep Sea 1,230 
Near Sea 817 
Short Sea 1,010 
Deep Sea 570 
Near Sea 1911 
Short Sea 2,051 
Deep Sea 3,538 
All routes 7,520 
Exports Imports Exports 
150 343 178 
112 273 33 
107 442 110 
100 125 134 
111 1,026 111 
28 600 21 
342 1,177 952 
294 924 446 
688 619 2,534 
592 1,645 1,264 
517 2,223 590 
823 1,661 2,665 
1,791 5,525 4,538 
Source: Department of Transport, Origin and Destination Survey, 1978. Special Tabulations 
Table 5: Bulk trades: Regional markets and role of local ports 
nland origin! I 
d estination 
G 
0 
reater London 
ther South East 
T OTAL 
All Bulk Trade 
(000's tonnes) 
Imports Exports 
9,605 164 
594 192 
10,199 356 
Source: Port Choice and the Routing of UK Trade 
E.C.L./DTp, Table 3.4, p.3.10 
Bulk Trade through 
Local Port 
(% of total) 
Imports Exports 
94% 91% 
90% 66% 
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Table 6: Traffic1 through the Port of London by Commodity2, 1972-81 
1972 1978 1981 
000 %of 000 o~ of 000 %of 
tonnes GB tonnes GB tonnes GB 
Foodstuffs 4929 20.2 4678 17.1 4416 15.7 
BASIC MATERIALS 5094 10.7 4761 10.8 3887 9.6 
of which: 
Wood, lumber, cork 1194 20.9 1100 22.6 780 16.9 
Pulp & waste paper 803 26.9 757 32.7 575 28.1 
Ores and scrap 803 3.7 613 3.2 699 3.7 
Crude fertilizers) 
& crude minerals) 1502 11.2 847 6.4 340 3.2 
MANUFACTURED GOODS 7699 18.5 8097 14.9 6128 11.8 
of which: 
Chemicals 1335 11.5 1206 7.7 1076 7.0 
Cement 795 65.2 1840 79.9 745 71.6 
Iron & steel 859 10.1 974 10.8 757 9.2 
Non-ferrous metals 435 20.4 459 22.4 139 8.7 
Machinery 617 20.4 493 13.0 475 12.6 
Vehicles 555 25.0 353 9.5 246 9.9 
Wood and cork mfs. 572 39.3 459 25.3 311 19.2 
TOTAL 17,723 15.6 17,536 14.0 14,431 12.0 
Source: National Ports Council Statistics 
1. Foreign and coastwise 
2. Excluding fuels 
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Roll-on/roll-off traffic is more 'footloose' in terms of port choice, and the 
consultants concluded that London would find it harder to compete. 
24.40 These conclusions were put to the public inquiry together with the cost 
model developed by the consultants. The GLC made it clear that this model 
excluded from the assumed costs of using the London docks the proportion of 
the PLA's charges which relates to the historic costs of the NDLS. The PLA, as 
has been said, has been expected to carry the costs of severance pay and of 
employing' surplus' labour under the NDLS. Since the PLA was also expected 
to balance its books, it attempted to pass these costs on to its customers. This 
strategy, in turn, led to further loss of trade and thus made the PLA's financial 
situation worse. · 
24.41 The GLC's view is that the financial arrangements imposed on the PLA 
by government policies have taken insufficient account of national transport 
priorities. They have not, for example, reflected the public costs of the much 
greater use of the roads involved in the switch to ports outside London. Nor 
have they taken account of the public cost of increased unemployment and 
decay in a particularly deprived part of the city. A national policy for the ports 
would take account of all the public costs involved and would entail relieving 
Table 7: Unitised Traffic by Port, 1970-81 
1970 1975 1978 1981 
000 000 000 000 
tonnes % tonnes ~lo tonnes % tonnes % 
TOTAL 
Great Britain 16,880 100 29,082 100 39,299 100 42,988 100 
Total south east ports 7,643 45.3 15,537 53.4 22,631 57.6 25,726 59.8 
London 1,591 9.4 2,500 8.6 3,601 9.2 4,144 9.6 
Dover 1,265 7.5 3,129 10.8 4,978 12.7 6,392 14.6 
Southampton 806 4.8 2,207 7.0 3,170 8.1 1,660 3.9 
Felixstowe 1,412 8.4 3,198 11.0 4,390 11.2 5,710 13.3 
Ipswich/Harwich/etc. 2,569 15.2 3,376 11.6 4,641 11.8 5,247 12.2 
Other south east ports n.a. n.a. 1,127 3.9 1,852 4.7 2,573 6.0 
Source: Port Statistics: Department of Transport and British Ports Association. 
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the Port of London of part at least of the historically determined costs of 
carrying a fixed labour force. This would enable the Port of London to lower its 
charges and to compete on more equal terms with the non-Scheme ports. 
24.42 This still leaves the issue of the scope for reviving trade in the Port of 
London, in the overall context of over-capacity in British ports, coupled with 
declining trade. How, in such a context, could any revival of London's ports 
take place without simply shifting trade and jobs from elsewhere - the type of 
'beggar my neighbour approach' which the GLC has specifically been 
determined to avoid? 
24.43 The GLC has not been arguing that the Royal Docks, nor any other part 
of the upstream port, could simply be restored to its former levels of activity; or 
that the decline of the previous ten to fifteen years could simply be reversed by 
an effort of will or policy. On the contrary, the case that the GLC argued on the 
basis of their consultants' study was that certain specific trades and routes 
could be identified where there was growth potential, in the sense that the 
overall volume of imports is increasing, and that in these trades there are 
genuine cost advantages for the upstream port. If appropriate investments 
were made in the specialised facilities to cater for these, then part of the docks 
(as well as the river wharves) could be retained, and could provide port and 
port related employment. This specialist, London-directed traffic would not, 
by definition, be substantially competing with other ports. In any case there is 
no advantage in jobs going out of London if they involve less favourable 
employment conditions for the workforce and if, in addition, they involve extra 
public costs for the road system. 
24.44 The trades and routes which were identified as having potential for 
London were l~ad-on/load-off container traffic (i.e. containers without lorries) 
on short sea routes, particularly Iberian and Scandinavian traffic with origins 
and destinations in the south east, and non-containerised traffic, particularly 
foodstuffs and basic materials for the local London market. The short sea routes 
represent potentially growing areas of trade, especially with the proposed 
enlargement of the EEC, as trading patterns move away from traditional 
deep-sea Commonwealth routes towards greater trade with western Europe, 
including Greece, Portugal and Spain, for example in fruit and wines. 
24.45 The consultants also considered the potential for developing specialist 
feeder lines from deep sea trade at Rotterdam. In other words, certain deep sea 
commodities which currently go to Rotterdam, en route for the London and 
south east market, could be transhipped in smaller vessels, to the upstream 
port, rather than being taken on from Rotterdam, across the Channel, and then 
by road. The commodities which the consultants identified as having potential 
relevance for the upstream port, and the Royals in particular, in terms of short 
sea routes included not only fresh fruit, vegetables and wine, but building 
materials, scrap metal and forest products (typical of commodities which, 
because of their bulk, are advantageously shipped as close as possible to their 
destination). There already exist specific examples of river uses for aggregates 
for the building trade to meet very particular local markets, for example at 
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Table 8: UK Port Traffic by trading area, 1971-88 
Trading Area 1971 1978 1983 1988 
DI % ~I~ % / 0 
EEC1 
Imports 12.2 18.2 19.5 20.8 
Exports 10.6 18.4 18.1 18.8 
TOTAL 22.8 36.6 37.6 39.6 
OTHER SHORT SEA2 
Imports 22.7 16.8 17.5 17.1 
Exports 7.4 7.1 7.2 7.2 
TOTAL 30.1 23 .9 24.7 24.3 
DEEPSEA3 
Imports 37.0 29.3 28.7 27.5 
Exports 10.1 10.2 9.0 8.6 
TOTAL 47.1 39 .5 37.7 36.1 
TOTAL 
Imports 71.9 64.3 65.7 65.4 
Exports 28.1 35.7 34.3 34.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: UK International Freight Forcasts, NPC 1980 
Notes: 1. Republic of Ireland, West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Denmark. 
2. Other Scandinavian, Baltic, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Central and Eastern Europe, Other 
Mediterranean 
3. All other countries. 
Dagenham Dock. This is a trade which is relatively unlikely to be gained in one 
area at the expense of another. 
24.46 A 1978 Department of Transport study has shown that 70% of bulk 
cargoes are shipped through a port in the same region, compared to only 27"lo 
of containerised goods. In the timber trade, Lenanton's have remained in East 
London and continue to use the river wharves. Similarly, newsprint is still 
brought in via specific upstream wharves, for example Convoys Wharf, and 
there is the possibility that new national newspaper printing plants might bring 
in newsprint through the river wharves. The GLC's consultants based part of 
their evidence on interviews with shipping lines, shipping agents and 
importers and exporters of commodities. The purpose of these interviews was 
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Table 9: Port Traffic 1965-88 in Britain 
Million Tonnes 
1965 1970 1975 1978 1981 1983 1988 
Forecast Forecast 
Central Central 
Case Case 
GBTOTAL 101.9 111.3 110.1 125.6 120.6 126.3 137.4 
of which 
Foreign Imports 69.6 74.3 67.9 74.1 70.0 76.4 82.5 
Exports 20.0 24.9 29.4 37.3 38.9 35.5 39.3 
Coastwise 
Inwards 6.3 5.9 5.7 6.2 5.1 6.2 6.7 
Outwards 6.0 6.1 7.1 7.9 6.6 8.2 8.9 
TOTAL 12.3 12.0 12.8 14.1 11.7 14.4 15.6 
Sources: National Ports Council, Department of Transport/British Ports Association National Digest of Ports 
Statistics and UK International Freight Forecasts to 1988, National Ports Council, 1980 
to test out their identification of potential trades for the Royals by asking 
potential users what their interest would be in returning to the upstream docks, 
if appropriate specialist facilities were provided. On the basis of these• 
interviews they concluded that relatively modest investments could enable a 
limited port facility, using the north side of one of the three docks in the Royals, 
to be viable. 
24.47 Some of these conclusions have been challenged, and they clearly 
require more research. There are undoubtedly difficulties about any major 
expansion of upstream facilities, in particular the problem of competition with 
other ports, given the depressed state of world trade and the current 
over-capacity of British ports. The GLC's main arguments are that there is a 
strong case for safeguarding the future uses of the upstream port, and that 
there are, in addition, existing uses, which should be preserved and 
strengthened in the short term and if possible expanded in the longer term. 
24.48 In immediate terms, this involves an important strategic responsibility 
for the GLC. It is particularly urgent to act to preserve the Royal Docks now 
because of the pressures for alternative uses, including the proposed 
STOLport, since the STOLport would be incompatible with future port uses. 
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Meanwhile facilities have to be maintained, if they are to be potentially usable 
- including the regular maintenance of lock gates. Here again the GLC has an 
overall strategic responsibility, as spelt out in the amendments to the GLDP, 
published in September 1984. 
24.49 The GLC also has a strategic responsibility for safeguarding existing 
uses . In conjunction with GLEB, and on the basis of GLC-based Early Warning 
Systems, it is essential to preserve and expand port and port-related industries 
and jobs, including those on the wharves, as well as in docks such as 
Dagenham Dock. GLEB has an investment in Metropolitan Foods, inside the 
Royal Docks, and has developed an enterprise plan for the industry. It is 
working on plans with other firms in the area. The GLC and GLEB have 
produced a plan for retaining and developing industry on the north side of the 
Royal Albert Dock, based on discussions with employers and trade unions in 
North Woolwich and Silvertown. In addition, the GLC has a firm strategic 
commitment to the maximum use of the river, both for public activities such as 
the transport of refuse and for private activities wherever the GLC and the 
GLEB have planning or other involvements, through enterprise planning 
agreements for example. Already, for example the GLC has increased the use 
of the river for the transportation of waste by 12% and is building up the use of 
the new facilities at Western Riverside. 
24.50 Finally, the GLC has a key strategic role in co-ordinating plans for the 
use of the river for port and port-related activities with strategic plans for the 
freight industry more generally and for road haulage in London. This strategic 
concern also relates to the Council's responsibilities for developing plans to 
limit the environmental intrusion of heavy lorries. Plans for lorry bans have to 
be combined with positive alternative proposals for developing the road freight 
industry and for improving working conditions in road haulage as part of a 
co-ordinated plan for an integrated transport system combining road, rail and 
water in East London. 
24.51 Historically, as has already been argued, the docks were a transport 
interchange between water, road and rail. Despite the rundown of the docks 
themselves, and the departure of numbers of transport related firms, such as 
those road haulage firms which have moved further out towards Tilbury and 
the Channel ports, transport-related firms still represent a key local sector to 
build upon. These transport activities include both road haulage firms and 
related activities, such as vehicle repair, container repairs and groupage (or the 
packing and unpacking of cargoes). Currently, there are at least 52 companies 
in the Royal Docks area which are transport or transport-related. Together 
these firms employ some 1,000 people. In addition, other companies in the 
area, including Tate and Lyle, have their own transport divisions, or use 
sub-con tractors. 
24.52 These transport-related activities can still be built upon in this part of 
east London, to preserve jobs and to improve the·quality of existing jobs. Better 
facilities for lorry drivers could be provided at the lorry park in Beckton; this is a 
major employment issue, and an area in which conditions for lorry drivers are 
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significantly worse in Britain than in a number of other EEC countries. There is 
therefore a powerful case for developing an active sector strategy for the 
transport and transport-related distribution industries in east London. There 
are, in any case, changes in the sector with important implications arising from 
the restructuring of the road haulage sector. In particular there appears to be 
increasing integration between haulage on the one hand and warehousing, 
storage and distribution on the other. There is also some indication that the 
processes of restructuring are tending to reduce employment overall, to hold 
down wages and to pull especially warehousing acti,,ities outwards from 
London towards the M25 and beyond, on cheaper greenfield sites, for new 
automated single storey developments. 
24.53 The GLC's proposed lorry bans and permits for exemptions provide 
tools for intervening to encourage within London the activities which derive 
most economic and employment benefits from a London location, whilst 
discouraging the through traffic of heavy lorries which create congestion 
without contributing to key economic activities or to employment. 
24.54 Given the relatively good access of east London to the coastal routes 
and the motorway system, including the M2 and the M25, and given the still 
relatively low cost of land premises in east London and the large space 
requirements of many transport and distribution activities, this area has key 
potential for the future integration of economic and environmental policies for 
freight. 
24.55 Investment by GLEB in the transport sector in docklands needs to build 
upon the area's past, and to look at ways in which such investment can increase 
the integration of distribution, storage, haulage, repair and groupage and other 
related activities and improve working conditions, unionisation and levels of 
return in London-based transport and distribution activities . Such investment 
can, backed up with more research on the industry and its organisation, exploit 
the benefits of proximity to the enormous London market, and enable 
London-based activities to be competitive with those based outside. 
The People's Plan for the Royal Docks 
24.56 At the STOLport enquiry the PLA stated that it 'has no brief to consider 
the wider interests of the community'. The GLC, on the other hand, does. Its 
arguments for retaining dock activities upstream are based partly on the 
recognition that whole communities and many existing industries are 
dependent on them and are moreover suffering from great deprivation, as well 
as on arguments about the more rational organisation of transport and 
distribution nationally. 
24.57 The GLC has supported the People's Plan for the Royal Docks. This 
Plan was prepared by people living in Docklands; a summary of it was 
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published jointly by the Newham Docklands Forum and the GLC Popular 
Planning Unit. It is based on the strong organisations and traditions of 
community which exist in Docklands and on the needs of local people, for jobs 
and housing especially. It is thus in sharp contrast with the plans of the 
government and the LDDC, which appear to relegate Docklands to an overspill 
area for the City. 
24.58 The People's Plan proposes that the docks should be used both to 
provide local jobs, including the development of an industrial co-operative 
zone modelled on the successful Mondragon experiment in Spain, and to 
provide facilities for the community: for example, public housing with gardens 
in the spaces which are now empty round the docks, making use of the 
attractions of the water; a linking up of the communities now separated by the 
dock wall; greatly expanded childcare facilities; facilities for boating and 
training for boat-building linked to the commercial boat-building activities 
which still survive in the docks and which could be expanded; a national 
children's theatre and a 'Kids Kingdom' in the Royals; a sports centre in the 
Victoria Dock, in Shed 4, which is one of the largest structures without inside 
supports in Europe. 
24.59 Building upon these proposals, in consultation with the local borough 
of Newham and with local employers and trade unionists, the GLC and GLEB 
have drawn up plans for the retention, stabilisation and expansion of existing 
firms and jobs in the Royal Docks area. 
24.60 For this purpose, the GLC has also been negotiating with the PLA and 
the LDDC in an attempt to buy or lease 45 acres of land and to safeguard 
industrial space. 
24.61 All of these proposals are based on the view that the docks belong to the 
people of east London and should be retained, and developed, for their benefit. 
They have the full support of the GLC. 
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Proposals for action 
1. In order to ensure greater use of the river and its facilities, the GLC 
considers that strategic authority for the upstream Thames should be 
transferred from the Port of London Authority and the Thames Water 
Authority to the GLC, to plan and to market the port as well as for transport 
and leisure uses. 
2. The London Docklands Development Corporation should be abolished 
and responsibility for Docklands development should be returned to the GLC 
and the Boroughs. 
3. Industrial land and water links should be safeguarded for an integrated 
road, water and rail network in East London; the GLC will develop its policies 
for its own property in the area, and offer a flexible rent and lettings policy, 
geared to its industrial and employment objectives; it will continue to press 
for the purchase or lease to the G LC of an additional 45 acres of land within the 
Royal Docks complex. 
4. The GLC and GLEB will attempt to ensure, for example through 
enterprise planning agreements, that private firms use the river to transport 
goods, especially bulky goods such as newsprint and building aggregates. 
5. The GLC will increase its own use of the river, for example for the 
transportation of waste. 
6. The STOLport plan should be rejected, together with further compulsory 
land acquisition by the LDDC in the Docklands area, so as to safeguard 
industrial uses on the North side of the Royal Albert Docks and the potential 
for cargo handling in the Royal Docks. 
7. The GLC will continue to press the government for the removal of the 
historic cost disadvantages of the upstream port, as part of an integrated 
national ports strategy. 
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8. The GLC will develop a plan for GLEB investmentin freight/distribution, 
encouraging specific employment-generating activities in east London and 
linking these with road planning and the lorry bans; in consultation with the 
local borough it will develop plans for facilities for drivers in the lorry park in 
Beckton, as part of a wider strategy to improve working conditions in_ the 
industry. 
9. GLEB will continue to develop enterprise plans and promote investments 
in key sectors such as food and drink in the Docks area; the GLC and GLEB 
will continue to support the People's Plan for the Royal Docks and develop 
further plans, jointly with local people, trade unions and the local borough 
councils, for leisure uses of the water for local people, and for local industries 
and other facilities which also generate employment and training, such as 
boat building and repair. 
Source 
Roger Tym and Partners, The Potential for Future Docks Use of the Royals: Report for the GLC, l983. 
Port of London Authority, Annual Reports and Accounts . 
National Ports Council, Deparment of Transport/British Ports Association, National Digest of Ports 
Statistics and UK International Freight Forecasts to 1988, 1980. 
GLC, East London File, 1983. 
Community Development Project, The Costs of Industrial Change, 1977. 
Joint Docklands Action Group, London Docks: An Alternative Strategy, 1978. 
Docklands Joint Committee, London's Docklands: A Strategic Plan, 1976. 

The London Industrial Strategy is part of a rolling programme of 
strategy work on industry and employment policy in London. This 
volume has been produced for wider discussion, and we would 
welcome comments, submissions and further material. 
The Popular Planning Unit, with the assistance of trade union 
officers and trade union resource centres, is organising a series of 
community and trade union discussions based on the studies in 
this book and on the policies and priorities of trade unions and 
community groups themselves. This discussion programme will 
continue throughout 1985. Facilities will be available for paid time 
off work where it cannot be negotiated with the employer. 
Childcare will be provided. Background material will be compiled 
using the studies in this book and other relevant information and 
ideas. Appropriate trade union tutors and discussion leaders will 
be available. Details from the Popular Planning Unit, South Block 
Showroom, County Hall, London SEl 7PB. 
Groups or organisations that would like to discuss particular 
chapters, themes or omissions with researchers from the Industry 
and Employment Branch are also invited to contact us. 
Material which is to be considered for the second volume should be 
submitted by 30 September 1985. 
Please contact the Industry and Employment Branch, Room 6b, 
County Hall, London SEl 7PB. 

